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905 
THE STORY OF ME: THE UNDERPROTECTION 
OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SPEECH 
SONJA R. WEST∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article begins the debate over the constitutional underprotection 
of autobiographical speech. While receiving significant historical, 
scientific, religious, and philosophical respect for centuries, the time-
honored practice of talking about yourself has been ignored by legal 
scholars. A consequence of this oversight is that current free speech 
principles protect the autobiographies of the powerful but leave the stories 
of “ordinary” people vulnerable to challenge. Shifting attitudes about 
privacy combined with advanced technologies, meanwhile, have led to 
more people than ever before having both the desire and the means to tell 
their stories to a widespread audience.  
This Article argues that truthful autobiographical speech deserves 
heightened constitutional protection. An analysis applying the various 
goals of free speech protection to autobiographical speech establishes that 
it occupies an exceptional place in the public discourse—perhaps rivaled 
only by political speech. Autobiographical speech adds vital knowledge to 
the public debate while also preserving the essence of human autonomy. 
This Article concludes, therefore, that it is time for the law to recognize 
and to fully protect the freedom of autobiographical speech.
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“I was saying,” continued the Rocket, “I was saying—What 
was I saying?” 
“You were talking about yourself,” replied the Roman 
Candle. 
“Of course; I knew I was discussing some interesting 
subject when I was so rudely interrupted.”1  
INTRODUCTION 
It was early evening on a nondescript Tuesday when Jessica Cutler, a 
twenty-something Capitol Hill staffer, debuted her weblog2—or online 
journal—with this seemingly innocuous entry: “I have a ‘glamour job’ on 
the Hill. That is, I could not care less about gov or politics, but working 
for a Senator looks good on my resume. And these marble hallways are 
such great places for meeting boys and showing off my outfits.”3  
Writing under the pseudonym “Washingtonienne,” Cutler chronicled 
mundane details of her life such as the earrings she intended to buy (“I’m 
getting both blue and peach. And, yes, I will wear them to the office.”),4 a 
taco-eating contest she planned to win (“Bring it on.”),5 and her activities 
over the past weekend (“[O]n Friday, I ate a really good quesadilla and 
went to a movie.”).6  
Other details of her daily life, however, were decidedly less 
commonplace—in particular her ongoing sexual exploits with up to six 
different men.7 Identifying them by initials only, she openly wrote in 
graphic detail about her encounters with these men, some of whom she 
alleges were married, held powerful government positions, and paid her 
for sex.8 Many of her entries were salacious and offensive, yet 
interspersed among them were her observations about issues such as 
 
 
 1. OSCAR WILDE, The Remarkable Rocket, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF OSCAR WILDE 310, 
312 (Perennial 1989). 
 2. A weblog or “blog” is defined as “an online diary; a personal chronological log of thoughts 
published on a Web page . . . .” Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=weblog (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2005). 
 3. Poor Mojo’s Almanac(K) presents; The Story of the Washingtonienne, http://poormojo.org/ 
pmjadaily/washingtonienne.htm (republishing the Washingtonienne blog which was removed) (May 5, 
2004, 5:32 p.m.) (last visited Oct. 19, 2006). 
 4. Id. (May 6, 2004, 4:46 p.m.). 
 5. Id. (May 6, 2004, 3:26 p.m.). 
 6. Id. (May 17, 2004, 8:56 a.m.). 
 7. Id. (May 11, 2004, 2:21 p.m.). 
 8. Id. (May 11, 2004, 2:21 p.m.) (describing one man as “[m]arried man who pays me for sex. 
Chief of Staff at one of the gov agencies, appointed by Bush,” and another as “[a] sugar daddy who 
wants nothing but anal. Keep trying to end it with him, but the money is too good.”). 
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money,9 sexually transmitted disease,10 religion,11 and workplace 
relationships.12 Described by a reporter as “an American uber-individualist 
demanding the right to tell her own story her own way,”13 Cutler admitted 
later that her “blog” was in essence little more than “writing on the 
bathroom wall.”14 But she insisted, “Everything she posted was true.”15  
Cutler’s weblog survived only two weeks before she was publicly 
identified and fired from her job.16 Later one of the men she wrote about 
sued her for public revelation of private facts.17 In the lawsuit, which is 
still pending, the man does not dispute the truth of Cutler’s stories—only 
her right to tell them at the expense of his privacy. Under traditional 
privacy law, the crucial question in this case is likely to be whether 
Cutler’s blog is of “legitimate public concern” or “newsworthy.” Since 
proving that her personal daily journal qualifies as “newsworthy” will be 
difficult under current law, Cutler is facing a real risk of being legally 
penalized for telling “her own story her own way.” 
This face-off between rights of privacy and rights of publication is not 
a new one; courts and commentators have struggled with it for decades.18 
But what is new about Jessica Cutler’s case is the type of speech at issue. 
Unlike journalists reporting about a crime or the intimate details of 
celebrity life, Cutler faces legal penalties for engaging in one of America’s 
most time-honored pastimes—talking about herself. Through her blog, she 
was telling her life story in her own voice by relating personal 
 
 
 9. Id. (May 14, 2004, 4:34 p.m.) (discussing her salary and saying, “Most of my living expenses 
are thankfully subsidized by a few generous older gentlemen. I’m sure I am not the only one who 
makes money on the side this way: how can anybody live on $25K/year??”). 
 10. Id. (May 14, 2004, 9:53 a.m.) (writing that one of the men she was seeing “wants us to get 
tested together so we can stop using condoms. Isn’t that sweet? Hope I don’t have anything!”). 
 11. Id. (May 14, 2004, 9:53 a.m.) (discussing one of the men, “So I don’t know if it’s getting 
serious or what. We’re seeing each other every day now. I like him very much and he likes me. But 
can it go anywhere, i.e. marriage? I don’t know. He’s Jewish, I’m not. . . . I really just want to be a 
Jewish housewife with a big rock on my finger.”). 
 12. Id. (May 12, 2004, 9:28 a.m.) (discussing office rumors, “Me, I’m just hiding in my office 
until this blows over.”). 
 13. See April Witt, Blog Interrupted, WASH. POST MAG., Aug. 15, 2004, at 12, 16. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 28. 
 16. Id. at 14, 16. She also reportedly received a six-figure book deal and an offer to pose naked in 
Playboy. She claimed, however, that these outcomes were not her motivations for writing the blog. Id. 
at 15–16. 
 17. See Steinbuch v. Cutler, No. 1-05-cv-00970 PLF (D.D.C. filed May 16, 2005).  
 18. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) (“Because the 
gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of information, whether true or not, the 
dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is here that claims of 
privacy most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press. The face-off is 
apparent . . . .”). 
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experiences, observations, thoughts, and emotions. The question this 
Article addresses is exactly where an individual’s freedom to tell her own 
personal—and truthful—story falls in the free speech spectrum. What, if 
any, constitutional safeguards exist for the simple right to say, “this is 
what I did” and “this is what happened to me”? In essence, is there a First 
Amendment right to declare, “I was here”?  
To best illustrate the interest at stake, it is helpful to compare Cutler’s 
case to that of another woman, Susanna Kaysen. During the late 1990s, 
Kaysen began experiencing severe vaginal pain.19 For several years she 
suffered from her mysterious malady as she engaged in a wide-ranging 
and desperate search for a cure.20 Her medical condition caused havoc to 
many areas of her life, in particular to her relationship with her then live-in 
boyfriend.21 According to Kaysen, her boyfriend grew frustrated with her 
refusals to have sex and began having angry and violent outbursts that 
walked the line of criminality.22 Their relationship ended in 1998.23 
An author by profession,24 Kaysen published a memoir about her 
ordeal in 2001 titled, The Camera My Mother Gave Me.25 In her memoir 
Kaysen described her painful medical symptoms and their effects on her 
sex life in intimate detail. Referring to her ex-boyfriend in the book only 
as “my boyfriend,” she portrayed him as crude, insensitive, and sexually 
aggressive.26 Their relationship culminated in the book with a scene where 
she suggests that he might have tried to rape her.27  
After the book was published, Kaysen’s ex-boyfriend sued her 
claiming she violated his privacy by revealing intimate details about their 
relationship.28 As in the Cutler case, there was no dispute about the truth 
of Kaysen’s speech.29 The question before the court concerned the balance 
between the ex-boyfriend’s right of privacy and Kaysen’s freedom of 
speech. The court ruled in favor of Kaysen, finding that her discussion of 
how her medical condition affected their relationship was a matter of 
 
 
 19. Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767, 2004 WL 1194731, at *1 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 2004). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at *2. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at *5. 
 24. Kaysen gained fame writing about her teenage experiences in a mental institution in her first 
memoir, Girl, Interrupted, which was made into a critically acclaimed movie. Id. at *1; see also 
SUSANNA KAYSEN, GIRL, INTERRUPTED (1993). 
 25. SUSANNA KAYSEN, THE CAMERA MY MOTHER GAVE ME (Vintage 2002). 
 26. Bonome v. Kaysen, 2004 WL 1194731, at *1–*2. 
 27. Id. at *2. 
 28. Id. at *1. 
 29. Id. at *1. 
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“legitimate public concern” and therefore protected under current privacy 
law.30 The court, however, went on to note in dictum that there was “an 
additional interest in this case.”31 That interest, according to the court, was 
Kaysen’s “right to disclose her own intimate affairs,” which was at issue 
because she was “telling her own personal story.”32  
Comparison between Cutler and Kaysen’s stories is striking. Kaysen 
wrote about the intimate effects a medical condition had on her sexual 
relationship. Cutler, meanwhile, wrote about the intimate effects age, 
money, and power had on her sexual relationships. Both women spoke 
truthfully. The difference between the two, of course, is that Kaysen is an 
award-winning author and her speech was published as a book by Random 
House. Cutler, on the other hand, is a young unknown who published her 
speech through a personal weblog. The Constitution protected Kaysen in 
her desire to tell her story. Cutler, however, is in danger of being punished 
for telling hers. 
The question, therefore, is raised: When a speaker desires to tell her 
personal story, yet society has decided her life experiences are not 
“newsworthy” or of “legitimate public interest,” does the speaker 
nonetheless retain an “additional interest” of constitutional significance? 
In other words, does Jessica Cutler have the same interest as Susanna 
Kaysen in “telling her own personal story” and the same constitutional 
right “to disclose her own personal affairs”? With any possible 
“newsworthy” element removed, does an individual’s autobiographical 
interest carry any legal weight? 
The question of the freedom of autobiographical speech is important 
and timely, because Jessica Cutler is not alone. Rather she is part of an 
unprecedented movement of modern autobiographical speakers who 
possess a unique combination of a relaxed view of personal privacy, the 
desire to share their stories publicly, and the technological access to reach 
a widespread audience. To date, an estimated fifty million weblogs are in 
existence.33 While blogs cover all varieties of topics, more than 70% of 
them, like Cutler’s, are some type of personal journal.34 The fast and 
 
 
 30. Id. at *6. 
 31. Id. at *5. 
 32. Id. 
 33. JEFFREY HENNING, PERSEUS DEV. CORP., THE BLOGGING GEYSER (Apr. 8, 2005), 
http://www.perseus.com/blogsurvey/geyser.html. 
 34. Fernanda B. Viégas, Bloggers’ Expectations of Privacy and Accountability: An Initial 
Survey, 10 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM., article 12 (2005), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol10/issue3/ 
viegas.html; see also Burton Cole, I’ve Got the Blog Blues, TRIB. CHRON., July 30, 2002, 
http://www.tribune-chronicle.com/columnists/story/0710202005_col02cole10.asp (“Most bloggers just 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss4/3
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furious influx of weblogs and Internet “personal pages” services such as 
MySpace and Facebook has left scholars scrambling to discern their 
potential social and historic impact. As one historian noted, “I do not think 
it is an exaggeration to say that there are more diaries online now, than can 
be found in all the archives neatly preserved as the harvest of many 
centuries.”35 
New York Times Magazine culture editor Emily Nussbaum theorized 
that this new desire to talk publicly about personal experiences, 
particularly among the young, “has multiple roots, from Ricki Lake to the 
memoir boom to the AA confessional, not to mention thirteen seasons of 
‘The Real World.’”36 These modern speakers have learned that revealing 
personal experiences has its rewards and that “exposure may be painful at 
times, but it’s all part of the process of ‘putting it out there,’ risking 
judgment and letting people in,” Nussbaum reported.37  
But as John Donne famously stated, “No man is an island, entire of 
itself.”38 As these bloggers write about their lives, they inevitably discuss 
others as well. And studies show they are doing so without reservation. 
Two-thirds of bloggers “almost never” ask permission before writing 
about another person by name, according to a survey coming out of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.39 Predictably, the survey found 
that “bloggers are starting to come up against a range of privacy-related 
issues varying from minor embarrassments with family and friends to 
termination of their employment.”40 Jessica Cutler has been sued and she 
is surely not the last. Legal conflict over autobiographical speech is likely 
in its infancy. 
Meanwhile, however, courts and commentators have paid basically no 
attention to the constitutional protection of autobiographical speech. The 
right to tell your own life story has received only passing reference in a 
handful of lower court decisions.41 And unlike the extensive academic 
 
 
write about how their day—or dates—went for anyone who cares to stop by and listen.”). 
 35. Gerard Schulte Nordholt, Online Diaries and Websites on Egodocuments, in 
EGODOCUMENTS AND HISTORY 175, 176 (Rudolf Dekker ed., 2002). 
 36. Emily Nussbaum, My So-Called Blog, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 11, 2004, at 33, 34. 
 37. Id. 
 38. JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS AND DEATH’S DUEL 103 (Vintage 
Books 1999). 
 39. Viégas, supra note 34. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767, 2004 WL 1194731, at *6 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 2004) (finding an 
autobiographical story is protected by the First Amendment insofar as it is related to a matter of 
legitimate public interest); Anonsen v. Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700, 705–06 (Tex. App. 1993) (finding 
autobiographical speaker had First Amendment right to reveal her own identity on matter of legitimate 
public interest); Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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debates waged over political speech, hate speech, commercial speech, 
corporate speech, workplace speech, speech by criminals, and obscenity, 
there has been no legal scholarship regarding the age-old practice of 
talking about yourself as it pertains to the First Amendment.42 While at 
first glance some of this contemporary autobiographical speech might 
appear trivial, egotistical, or merely salacious, the value of such expression 
on micro and macro levels is immense. These modern speakers are a 
continuation of an American tradition that has a proven value both to 
individuals and to the general public.  
This Article begins the discussion on the constitutional value of truthful 
autobiographical speech. On the first pass it might seem that the question 
of constitutional protection for autobiographical speech is settled. Clearly 
the First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law” restricting 
free speech and, of course, a person telling his life story is speech. For all 
their disagreement, moreover, most free speech scholars accept the 
Supreme Court’s approach that speech is first assumed to be protected 
unless it is shown to fall into a narrow exception of harmful speech.43 Yet 
such a straightforward analysis applies to all speech and works only until 
the speech in question clashes with the rights of others. It is simply not 
clear at this time where autobiographical speech stands when it must be 
balanced against other interests. For example, is the autobiographical 
speech of a sex worker protected speech or is it obscenity?44 Similarly, is 
the life story of a Klansman protected by the First Amendment or is it 
better classified as hate speech?45 Can a state stop a convicted murderer 
 
 
autobiographical speech is protected if there is a logical nexus to a matter of legitimate public interest). 
 42. Research for this Article yielded no legal commentary on the question of how 
autobiographical speech should be treated by the courts or how it should be analyzed under the First 
Amendment. There has, of course, been a lively discussion among legal academics regarding the role 
of narrative and personal storytelling in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the 
Self: Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1995) (discussing 
outsider legal scholarship and its reliance on autobiographical narratives); Mari J. Matsuda, Public 
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323 (1989) 
(“There is an outsider’s jurisprudence growing and thriving alongside mainstream jurisprudence in 
American law schools.”). 
 43. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (“From 1791 to the present 
. . . a limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our First Amendment 
jurisprudence.”) 
 44. See, e.g., Marjorie Heins, A Public University’s Response to Students’ Removal of an Art 
Exhibit, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 209 (1993) (discussing the autobiographical work of a former 
sex worker and prostitutes’ rights advocate and arguing her autobiographical speech does not “merit 
dismissal with the reductionist epithet ‘pornography’”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 45. See, e.g., DAVID DUKE, MY AWAKENING (1998) (autobiography of former Klansman and 
Louisiana politician). 
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from telling his story as an improper attempt to profit from a crime?46 Is 
there a point at which the autobiography of a corporation’s C.E.O. will be 
construed as commercial speech and restricted?47 Can school 
administrators censor a high school student’s online journal?48 How much 
does the Constitution value autobiographical speech when it collides with 
laws in other areas such as intellectual property, workplace harassment,49 
campaign finance,50 contracts, or, in the most likely scenario, privacy? 
This Article seeks to establish that truthful autobiographical speech 
deserves heightened constitutional protection so when those conflicts 
occur, as they will do with increasing frequency, the free speech values of 
autobiographical speech will be recognized and given a fighting chance to 
prevail. As with core political debate, which is routinely held to be of 
superior value, or newsworthy speech regarding a matter in the public 
interest, which is usually protected from challenges, autobiographical 
speech should be zealously guarded. Like these other types of speech, 
autobiographical speech is distinctive because of the important functions it 
plays on dual fronts—to society and to the individual. Part I starts with a 
short look at the history of autobiographical speech and the forces that 
have led to this new “tell-all” era. It explores how shifts in cultural 
attitudes about privacy and the value of “ordinary” stories51 have mixed 
with technological advances to create a situation in which more people 
 
 
 46. See, e.g., Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. St. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105 (1991) (considering the constitutionality of “Son of Sam” laws, which attempt to prevent criminals 
from profiting from their crimes by selling their stories). 
 47. See, e.g., SAM WALTON, SAM WALTON: MADE IN AMERICA (1992) (autobiography of 
founder of Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retail chain). 
 48. See, e.g., Student Press Law Center, Miss. School Suspends Student for Calling Teacher 
‘Perverted’ in Online Journal, Jan. 29, 2004, http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=736 (discussing 
student who was suspended because of her personal weblog in which she “vented about the teacher’s 
mispronunciation of her last name, mocked his clothing and rejoiced that she would no longer be in his 
class”). 
 49. See, e.g., Fair v. Guiding Eyes For the Blind, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 151, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(lawsuit where plaintiff claimed workplace sexual harassment based on her supervisor’s comments 
about his own homosexuality including that he visited a psychiatrist who told him he “would never 
have a meaningful relationship” and that he and his “alleged lover” attended an event where they 
“were treated poorly”).  
 50. See, e.g., Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Blogs Face Possible FEC Regulation, FOX NEWS.COM, 
June 3, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,158466,00.html (discussing the Federal Election 
Commission’s consideration of government regulation of political weblogs). 
 51. This Article places the term “ordinary” in quotations because, as oral historian Studs Terkel 
explained, “it’s a patronizing word. They are not celebrities. Celebrities, we know, are celebrated for 
being celebrated, and they’re not very exciting. And ordinary people [haven’t] been asked about his, 
her life.” Online NewsHour, Conversation: Oral Histories (Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/bb/entertainment/july-dec05/studs_8-03.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2005) (transcript of 
interview with Studs Terkel).  
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than ever before have both the desire and the means to tell their stories to a 
large public audience. Part II then lays the groundwork for the 
constitutional discussion by taking a look at the competing theories of why 
the First Amendment protects speech. It examines the ongoing debate over 
the perceived benefits of free speech to society as a whole as well as to the 
individual. Once these various theories are clarified, Part III turns to an 
analysis of how autobiographical speech fares under these justifications 
and concludes that autobiographical speech is unique in its long-
established ability to advance the prominent goals of free speech on 
multiple levels. Then, Part IV closes by offering a proposal on how to 
adequately define and protect this right. Finally, a subsequent article will 
apply this proposal to the specific conflict between autobiographical 
speech and tort claims of public disclosure of inherently private facts such 
as the one at issue in the Jessica Cutler case.  
I. THE RISE OF THE “TELL-ALL” ERA 
People love to talk about themselves. It is a statement that, perhaps, 
needs no citation. As then-Professor Richard Posner noted, “Anyone who 
has ever sat next to a stranger on an airplane or a ski lift knows the delight 
that people take in talking about themselves to complete strangers.”52 
Autobiographical speech has a long and pedigreed past that is likely as old 
as human communication. But it also has experienced a surging popularity 
of late that is testing existing social boundaries. The story of how and why 
America became the tell-all nation it is today is a tale that combines this 
basic human instinct with changing standards on personal disclosure. New 
technologies, meanwhile, are making it increasingly easier and cheaper for 
anyone to spread his personal stories to a broader audience. As one 
historian observed, “At no other time in history have so many diaries been 
written and read by so many people in such a short time, using the 
centuries-old formats of writing about oneself in a medium that is younger 
than most of the authors themselves.”53  
A. A Brief History of Autobiographical Speech 
Answering the question of when human beings first began to talk about 
themselves raises philosophical, scientific, religious, historical, and social 
questions to which reams of academic literature have been devoted. It 
 
 
 52. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 400 (1978). 
 53. Nordholt, supra note 35, at 176. 
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involves complex issues such as when did man first gain consciousness or 
a sense of self, or develop a comprehension of time and death, and when 
and how did human communication abilities arise. These queries are 
clearly outside the more modest ambition of this Article. Suffice it to say, 
however, that the history of humans recording their lives is a long one.  
As long as 50,000 years ago, early humans chronicled basic 
observations of their world by painting images on cave walls and carving 
notches into bones to record the phases of the moon.54 Interestingly, one of 
the most widespread and repeated symbols of prehistoric rock art, 
discovered on every continent, is a stenciled or traced handprint55—
possibly some early form of personal signature or individual mark.56 The 
invention of writing brought more concrete evidence of humans recording 
their lives. From Egyptian hieroglyphic inscriptions57 to personal 
narratives of the Greeks and Romans58 to the “lyrical diaries” of tenth-
century Japanese aristocratic women,59 ancient autobiographical writings 
are pervasive. 
Clearly once humans began to write, they began to write about 
themselves. Thus it is accepted that “[a]n autobiographic instinct may be 
 
 
 54. See Paul S.C. Tacon & Sven Ouzman, Worlds Within Stone, in THE FIGURED LANDSCAPES 
OF ROCK-ART 39, 62 (Christopher Chippindale & George Nash eds., 2004); DONALD JOHANSON & 
BLAKE EDGAR, FROM LUCY TO LANGUAGE 106 (1996). 
 55. Sven Ouzman, Towards a Mindscape of Landscape, in THE ARCHEOLOGY OF ROCK-ART 30, 
33 (Christopher Chippendale & Paul S.C. Tacon eds., reprinted with corrections 2000). 
 56. The precise meaning of prehistoric handprint rock art is not clear. See id. (theorizing that 
hand prints might simply have been a desire of early man to touch the rock). 
 57. For example, many ancient Egyptian hieroglyphic inscriptions are believed to be 
autobiographical texts. JAMES P. ALLEN, MIDDLE EGYPTIAN: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LANGUAGE 
AND CULTURE OF HIEROGLYPHS 5 (2000). Other hieroglyphics found on the walls of temples or tombs 
date back to 1600 BC and earlier. See id. Similarly, relics of the main types of “Old Egyptian,” dating 
from 3000 to 2000 BC, include “a sizeable number of so-called ‘Autobiographies,’ which are accounts 
of individual achievements inscribed on the external walls of the rock tombs of the administrative 
elite.” ANTONIO LOPRIENO, ANCIENT EGYPTIAN: A LINGUISTIC INTRODUCTION 5 (1995).  
 58. According to one scholar, “the earliest self-story thus preserved—that is, the earliest 
continuous narrative as contrasted to a mere king’s name and figure—is the record of King Sargon, the 
reputed founder of Babylon,” who lived in approximately 3800 BC. Nicholas van Rijn, Introduction to 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD ix, x (Nicholas van Rijn ed., Univ. Press of the Pacific 
2002). There exist famous autobiographies from the Greeks, such as the Apology of Socrates, the self-
reflective plea that the philosopher reportedly gave to an Athenian court before being sentenced to 
death. Id. And the Romans left behind Julius Caesar’s personal narratives of his military campaigns 
from about 100 BC. Id. at xi. Saint Augustine’s Confessions, written around AD 397, is considered by 
many to be the first modern autobiography. Id. at ix. 
 59. SHUICHI KATO, A HISTORY OF JAPANESE LITERATURE 170 (Kodansha Int’l 2003) (1979) 
(“These diaries . . . were records, usually with dates, of the day-to-day lives of their authors, the things 
they saw and heard, and their emotions and impressions.”). The early Japanese also left national 
histories from the seventh and eighth centuries. See id. at 37. 
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as old as Man Writing.”60 Yet some scholars, such as Professor Karl 
Weintraub, contend that “only since 1800 has Western Man placed a 
premium on autobiography.”61 Autobiographical theorist Georges Gusdorf 
agreed, declaring that autobiography is “peculiar to Western man”62—
Eurocentric view that has been challenged.63 This debate, however, raises 
the question on how to define “autobiographical speech.” Under the 
traditional definition, “autobiography” means only a written narrative in 
which the author explores his own life in its entirety and reflects on his 
existence. Other disciplines, however, accept a broader definition both in 
format and content that would, for example, include more casual 
expressions such as diaries, letters, or wills and other “texts in which an 
author wr[ites] about his or her own feelings, thoughts and actions.”64 This 
more expansive definition is in accord with the view of autobiographical 
speech discussed in this Article. 
B. The American Tradition of Autobiographical Speech 
Regardless of whether autobiographical speech is somehow unique to 
Western cultures, it undoubtedly has a strong American tradition. From 
the early Puritan diaries to Benjamin Franklin’s famous memoir65 and 
Frederick Douglass’s personal writings on slave life,66 Americans have 
been writing about themselves for more than 200 years, making 
autobiography a recognized American art form. As American literature 
critic William R. Robinson explained: “[W]hether practiced by Cotton 
Mather, Thoreau, Whitman, Hemingway, Henry Miller, or William Carlos 
Williams, to mention only the established literary figures, this form . . . 
celebrates fact in the making.”67  
While often the most celebrated, the conventional literary form of 
autobiography is only a small slice of the overall picture of Americans’ 
 
 
 60. Karl J. Weintraub, Autobiography and Historical Consciousness, 1 CRITICAL INQUIRY 821, 
821 (1975). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Georges Gusdorf, Conditions and Limits of Autobiography, in AUTOBIOGRAPHY: ESSAYS 
THEORETICAL AND CRITICAL 28, 29 (James Olney ed., 1980). 
 63. See, e.g., JANET GYATSO, APPARITIONS OF THE SELF 101 (1998) (calling Gusdorf’s statement 
“wrong” and pointing to the history of Tibetan autobiographies). 
 64. Rudolf Dekker, Introduction to EGODOCUMENTS AND HISTORY 7, 7 (Rudolf Dekker ed., 
2002). 
 65. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (Touchstone 2003). 
 66. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN 
SLAVE (Yale University Press 2001). 
 67. George Garrett, My Silk Purse and Yours, in THE SOUNDER FEW 327, 332 (R.H.W. Dillard et 
al. eds., Univ. of Ga. Press 1971) (1964) (quoting American literature critic William R. Robinson). 
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drive to talk about themselves. Literary critic Alfred Kazin explained that 
“the experience of being so much a ‘self’—constantly explaining one-self 
and telling one’s own story—is as traditional in the greatest American 
writing as it is in a barroom.”68 Autobiographical expression, according to 
autobiography critic Albert Stone, “leaps barriers of literacy itself to 
become a form of folk expression.”69  
It is this leap from the dusty tomes lining library shelves to more casual 
expression that distinguishes the new American impulse toward 
autobiographical speech. Increasingly more Americans yearn to tell their 
story—both their successes and their sins—as if they “feel their very 
definition as persons, as selves, depends on their having matter to 
confess,” Professor Peter Brooks noted.70 Commentators debate exactly 
why, or even when this change occurred, but at some point, as philosopher 
Michel Foucault observed, “Western man became a confessing animal.”71  
The possible causes of this free and open self-disclosure trend are 
many. This is due in part, no doubt, to “[a]utobiography’s complex nature 
as simultaneously history, art, confession, and testament.”72 Some have 
pointed to the rise in Freudian psychotherapy and its belief that sharing 
and reflection on life events offers personal benefits. Others have argued 
that religious confession, particularly the Catholic model, “permeates our 
culture” and has promoted the perception that talking about past bad acts 
is redeeming.73 According to Brooks, “even those whose religion or 
nonreligion has no place for the Roman Catholic practice of confession are 
nonetheless deeply influenced by the model.”74  
Some blame Americans’ reverence for individualism and a capitalistic 
society that rewards self-interested conduct.75 These factors foster egoism 
and might have resulted in an explosion of “conversational narcissism,” 
which sociologist Charles Derber describes as the tendency of Americans 
“to turn the topics of ordinary conversations to themselves.”76 Another 
theory is that in modern society there has been a breakdown of the 
traditional hierarchies of classes and social status—the past indicators of 
 
 
 68. Alfred Kazin, The Self as History, in THE AMERICAN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 31, 32 (Albert E. 
Stone ed., 1981) (emphasis omitted). 
 69. ALBERT E. STONE, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL OCCASIONS AND ORIGINAL ACTS 2 (1982). 
 70. PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS 140 (2000). 
 71. Id. at 99, citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTOIRE DE LA SEXUALITÉ, 1: LA VOLONTÉ 80 
(Gallimard 1976). 
 72. STONE, supra note 69, at xiv. 
 73. BROOKS, supra note 70, at 2. 
 74. Id. 
 75. CHARLES DERBER, THE PURSUIT OF ATTENTION 5 (Oxford 2000) (1979). 
 76. Id. at 4. 
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personal identity—forcing people to reveal more about themselves in 
order to gain trust and intimacy. Professor Jeffrey Rosen explained that 
“[t]he ease with which we reveal ourselves to strangers suggests that in the 
face of widespread anxiety about identity, people are more concerned with 
the feeling of connection than with the personal and social costs of 
exposure.”77 This drive has created what Brooks calls a “generalized 
demand for transparency”78 and Stone described as “[a] powerful need to 
listen to each others’ personal histories (and thus to learn more about our 
own)” which he claimed “runs throughout our mobile, polyglot culture.”79  
There appears to be general consensus that cultural and social shifts of 
the last century play a role in the increased openness. As sociologist 
Richard Sennett observed in 1977, “Masses of people are concerned with 
their single life-histories and particular emotions as never before.”80 Many 
point specifically to the change in the cultural climate during the onset of 
the “baby boom” generation and the rebellious 1960s. Journalist Celina 
Ottaway observed that the baby boomers adopted an altered view of the 
importance of their own “ordinary” life experiences. She commented that:  
Memoirs were once for presidents, retired generals and Cher. But in 
recent years, baby boomers have decided that their stories are at 
least as interesting as those of politicians. The first-person genre is 
perfectly suited to a generation that has grown up talking about 
itself and expecting the world to listen.81  
Whether acting as a cause or effect of the trend, the media are 
accredited with sending the message that a person no longer needs power, 
position, fame, wealth, or even tragedy or oppression in order to engage in 
autobiographical speech. For example, radio and television talk shows 
embrace and broadcast the stories of “average” Americans. Brooks 
observed that talk shows reflected the changing norms by “put[ting] on 
television ordinary people speaking confessionally about their own lives in 
ways unthinkable to earlier generations.”82 Such shows were so successful 
that soon the sight and sound of “ordinary” people discussing their 
 
 
 77. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD 169–70 (2004). 
 78. BROOKS, supra note 70, at 4; see also ANGELO COSTANZO, SURPRIZING NARRATIVE 7 
(1987) (“The breakdown of the commonality of values and aims has given each individual the difficult 
task of seeking his own identity in a world that does not offer clear-cut guidelines to living. . . . and 
thus autobiographical writing has become a significant mode of literature.”) 
 79. STONE, supra note 69, at xiii. 
 80. RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN 5 (1977). 
 81. Celina Ottaway, Memoir Mania, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Mar. 6, 1999, at D1. 
 82. BROOKS, supra note 70, at 140. 
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problems became a ubiquitous part of American culture and “nearly 
banal.”83  
C. The Modern Trend of Public Self-Disclosure 
It is clear that the “tell-all” era is thriving. No longer is autobiography 
reserved for the powerful to reflect on key personal events as they near the 
end of their lives. Today’s autobiographical speech is considered a 
democratic, beneficial mode of expression equally available to every 
person about any topic and at any time.  
Television talk shows and reality programming that focus on the 
ordinary person remain prevalent. Memoir writing classes are exploding in 
popularity84 and numerous how-to books offer assistance on writing a 
personal history.85 The national nonprofit organization StoryCorps, 
working with National Public Radio, is building stationary and mobile 
recording booths across the country in order to record the stories of 
everyday Americans.86 Another non-profit organization, the Center for 
Autobiographic Studies, explains that life stories “may be written for self-
understanding, for preserving family and cultural history, or for pooling 
the wisdom to be gained from diverse individuals’ life experiences.”87 
The newfound respect for the “every man” story also sparked a surge in 
the popularity of published memoirs by the non-famous. Many critics 
credit Frank McCourt’s 1996 best-selling and Pulitzer Prize-winning 
memoir Angela’s Ashes about his impoverished childhood in Ireland for 
the phenomenon.88 Today the “[n]onfiction shelves at Barnes & Noble are 
filled with the stories of average people.”89 Indeed, personal memoirs no 
longer even require the traditional elements of tragedy or triumph to be 
published and read. Recently, author Amy Krouse Rosenthal perplexed 
literary critics with her autobiography, Encyclopedia of an Ordinary Life, 
which she began by declaring: “I have not survived against all odds. I have 
not lived to tell. I have not witnessed the extraordinary. This is my 
 
 
 83. BROOKS, supra note 70, at 4. 
 84. Jill Hamburg Coplan, Moved to Write Memoirs, NEWSDAY, Mar. 13, 2004, available at 
http://www.turnonyourinnerlight.com/newsday_com%20-%20News2.htm. 
 85. See, e.g., JUDITH BARRINGTON, WRITING THE MEMOIR (Eighth Mountain 1997); TRISTINE 
RAINER, YOUR LIFE AS STORY (1997).  
 86. StoryCorps, http://www.storycorps.net (last visited Aug. 27, 2005). 
 87. Center for Autobiographic Studies, http://www.storyhelp.com/index.htm (last visited Aug. 
27, 2005). 
 88. FRANK MCCOURT, ANGELA’S ASHES (Scribner 1996). 
 89. Ottaway, supra note 81, at D1. 
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story.”90 She went on to tell the reader of her personal experiences with 
such things as kitchen appliances, Q-tips, and gas stations.91 In a recent 
New York Times article, art critic William Grimes lamented the memoir 
boom and asked his readers, “Is there not something to be said for the 
unexamined life?”92 
And then there is, of course, the Internet. As the number of weblogs 
grows exponentially so does the amount of autobiographical speech. “The 
clacking noise we hear in the air,” Professor Rosen observed, “is the noise 
of endless personal disclosure.”93 While blogs are devoted to a range of 
topics, many offer entry-by-entry snapshots of the author’s past and 
present life story—generally presented in reverse chronological order. One 
blogger mused on her weblog, in an entry titled “Blogging as 
Autobiography,” that online journals “differ from traditional forms of 
autobiography in that they do not, as yet, tell the story of an entire life. But 
they are, most certainly, autobiographical.”94 This view of autobiography 
as fragmented and ongoing, part present and part past, is another break 
from the traditional autobiography format. This shift is likely a result of a 
modern culture that no longer can wait until the end to begin telling its 
story. This is the same quickening pace of society that led Malcolm X to 
write in a letter to author Alex Haley, “‘How is it possible to write one’s 
autobiography in a world so fast-changing as this?’”95  
Perhaps the most unique aspect of autobiographical speech on the 
Internet is the technological opportunity it offers people to talk about 
themselves to a very large, even global, audience. A reporter for the 
Hindustan Times observed that “the sheer number of people out there on 
the Internet rambling on about their personal lives, thoughts and beliefs for 
the benefit of random passers-by, can blow your mind.”96 Some of these 
online diaries offer insights into matters of worldwide impact. One young 
blogger, for example, described the beginning of his weblog in 2002 as 
being filled with admittedly trivial entries like “that girl got married, I had 
the flu, he had I don’t know what. Stupid stuff.”97 But soon he began to 
 
 
 90. AMY KROUSE ROSENTHAL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AN ORDINARY LIFE (2005). 
 91. Id. 
 92. William Grimes, We All Have A Life. Must We All Write About It?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 
2005, at E27. 
 93. ROSEN, supra note 77, at 191. 
 94. Beautiful Monsters, http://www.stonesoup.co.nz/ecoqueer/archives/004234.html (Nov. 8, 
2004, 7:49 p.m.) (last visited July 27, 2005). 
 95. Alex Haley, Epilogue to MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 390, 415 
(Ballentine Books 1999) (1964) (quoting letter from Malcolm X to Alex Haley). 
 96. Kushalrani Gulab, Diaries of Nobodies, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Aug. 6, 2004. 
 97. Rory McCarthy, Salam’s Story, The Guardian, May 30, 2003, available at 
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write in more detail about the daily hardships of his life, which was 
internationally noteworthy because he was a young Iraqi living in pre-war 
Baghdad.98 Like a modern Anne Frank, his blog described life under the 
regime of Saddam Hussein, the build-up to war, the beginning of the 
bombing, and the lawlessness that followed.99 At one point his writings 
became the most linked-to blog on the Internet and was labeled “the most 
gripping account of the Iraq conflict” by one of Great Britain’s largest 
newspapers.100 
Most blogs, however, provide information that is not front-page news. 
Instead they discuss “ordinary moments in the lives of ordinary people.”101 
They are written by and about the “[p]eople who wouldn’t normally have 
the chance to share their stories with the world.”102 Take, as another 
example, the personal website of Glenn K. Garnes, a forty-three-year-old 
lawyer. On his home webpage, Garnes likely speaks for many bloggers 
when he explains why he started his weblog: “I could never have gotten 
anyone to publish the book of my life story, but through the magic of the 
Internet, I can create the living autobiography of Glenn K. Garnes.”103 He 
tells his website’s visitors: “I’d love to tell you all about me. I live a very 
exciting life, and I love for others to experience the burden of hearing 
about it! I can talk about me forever, and if you stay long enough I 
will.”104 
In talking about themselves in such an open forum, the bloggers 
highlight one of the most significant cultural shifts of the tell-all era—
reduced inhibitions about self-exposure. According to New York Times 
Magazine culture reporter Emily Nussbaum, the new autobiographical 
speakers have “a degraded or a relaxed sense of privacy; their experiences 
may be personal, but there’s no shame in sharing.”105 In return, the pay-off 
for this openness is “a new kind of intimacy, a sense that they are known 
and listened to. This is their life, for anyone to read.”106 Another reporter 
noted that while past generations kept their diaries locked and hidden in a 
 
 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,966819,00.html (last visited July 27, 2005); see also 
Where is Raed?, http://dear_raed.blogspot.com/ (the weblog discussed in the text) (last visited July 27, 
2005). 
 98. McCarthy, supra note 97. 
 99. McCarthy, supra note 97. 
 100. McCarthy, supra note 97. 
 101. Beautiful Monsters, supra note 94. 
 102. Beautiful Monsters, supra note 94. 
 103. One Big Blog!, http://www.glenngarnes.com/ (last visited July 27, 2005). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Nussbaum, supra note 36, at 34. 
 106. Id. 
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sock drawer, the blog by comparison is “lying wide open on the dining 
room table, and might even include digital photos.”107 Many bloggers also 
cherish the chance to write to such a wide audience without going through 
the filters of teachers, employers, editors, or publishers. As one blogger 
explained, “There is no one to say ‘you can’t write about what you had for 
breakfast—nobody wants to read about that.’”108 
The trend toward increasingly more self-disclosure through 
autobiographical speech is significant and to many observers it appears 
unrelenting. Meanwhile, the social, political, and legal ramifications of 
this free flow of personal information are only beginning to surface. As 
conflicts develop, courts will be asked to balance the freedom of 
autobiographical speech against other interests. The existing approach 
favors speech that is either “political” or “newsworthy”—terms that likely 
do not apply to the life stories of “ordinary” people. Simple reliance on 
these traditional criteria threatens to put too small a price on the stories of 
the non-famous and non-powerful. The next Part explores the rationales 
for free speech protection—a widely debated topic. This section lays the 
groundwork for the examination that follows in Part III regarding where 
autobiographical speech fits under the constitutional umbrella. 
II. COMPETING THEORIES FOR FREE SPEECH PROTECTION 
That free speech is valuable and deserves constitutional protection is 
not a controversial idea in this country. To most, it seems self-evident. As 
the United States Supreme Court has stated, the freedom of speech is 
“among the fundamental personal rights and liberties” secured under the 
Constitution.109 Exactly why free speech is so important, however, is far 
less obvious, but the answer is crucial to determining the amount of 
protection it should receive. Thus, a spirited debate has ensued.110 In order 
to determine the constitutional role of autobiographical speech, these 
various theories need to be examined. While any categorization of these 
many values is certain to be imperfect, it is nonetheless helpful to frame 
the discussion. This Part divides them broadly into society-based and 
individual-based theories of free speech. 
 
 
 107. Cole, supra note 34. 
 108. Beautiful Monsters, supra note 94. 
 109. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). 
 110. Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1284 (1983) (“We are 
now experiencing an attention to the underlying premises of the principle of freedom of speech that is 
both more conscious and more sustained than at any time in the past.”). 
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A. Society-Based Theories of Free Speech 
The first group of theories in support of guarding speech from 
censorship focuses on the benefits that open expression yields to society as 
a whole. Under these theories, freedom of speech advances the general 
welfare and aids the democratic process by promoting an ethical and open 
government and an informed citizenry. It accomplishes these goals 
primarily by encouraging the discovery of truth by all citizens through 
increased knowledge, debate, and understanding of opposing views. 
1. The Search for Truth 
The most prominent society-based theory is that uninhibited speech is 
vital to the quest for the truth in the “marketplace of ideas.” While not 
developed by him, this theory was made famous by Justice Holmes in his 
dissent in Abrams v. United States where he argued that “the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market.”111 Justice Brandeis agreed, arguing in a concurrence that “[i]f 
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to 
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is 
more speech, not enforced silence.”112 Eventually this theory of the First 
Amendment found its way into a Supreme Court majority opinion in 
which the Court held that “utterances honestly believed contribute to the 
free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.”113  
While Justice Holmes gave the truth-discovery theory prominence, 
John Milton first envisioned it in his 1644 essay arguing that true and false 
ideas should be debated openly. He wrote of the search for truth: “Let her 
and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free 
and open encounter.”114 Two hundred years later John Stuart Mill 
developed the idea further in his famous essay “On Liberty.”115 Like 
Milton, Mill’s most basic idea is that truth emerges through competition 
with conflicting ideas and falsehoods. In Mill’s more eloquent words, if a 
truthful idea is silenced society is “deprived of the opportunity of 
exchanging error for truth,” and if a false idea is suppressed it loses “what 
 
 
 111. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 112. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 113. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). 
 114. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 45 (Liberty Fund 1999) (1644). 
 115. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 3 (Modern 
Library 2002). 
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is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression 
of truth, produced by its collision with error.”116  
The harm of such censorship, according to Mill, is not inflicted on the 
silenced individual but rather on “the human race; posterity as well as the 
existing generation.”117 Similarly, the advantages of free speech apply 
broadly to everyone. Mill theorized that society is benefited by exposure 
to a diverse sampling of viewpoints.118 He also used the word “opinion” 
interchangeably with “truth” suggesting that he was embracing the 
protection of more than simply provable empirical facts and including 
speech about values and other less tangible ideas.119 These thoughts were 
picked up by Judge Learned Hand a century later when he wrote that the 
First Amendment protects “the most vital of all general interests”120 that 
information be heard “from as many different sources, and with as many 
different facets and colors as is possible.”121  
2. Advancing Collective Self-Governance 
Diverging somewhat from Mill’s broad view, a subset of the 
marketplace of ideas theory evolved supporting the more narrow belief 
that only “public” speech that is relevant to self-governance must be 
protected. This theory is often attributed to Alexander Meiklejohn, 
although the originality of Meiklejohn’s ideas has been questioned.122 
Meiklejohn believed that only speech contributing to the debate of public 
issues should receive absolute protection.123 To scholars in Meiklejohn’s 
camp, free speech is an instrument that if used correctly will lead to more 
informed citizens who will then elect the most knowledgeable 
representatives who will “not only adopt the wisest course of action but 
carry it out in the wisest way.”124 The ultimate Meiklejohnian vision is of 
the town hall meeting where informed citizens are openly debating the 
pressing issues of the day with their elected officials.125  
 
 
 116. Id. at 19. 
 117. Id. at 18–19. 
 118. Id. at 49 (discussing “the universality of the fact, that only through diversity of opinion is 
there, in the existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth”). 
 119. See, e.g., id. at 19 (“We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a 
false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.”). 
 120. U.S. v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L. J. 438, 447–48 (1983). 
 123. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE 37 (1960). 
 124. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1954). 
 125. Meiklejohn, supra note 123. 
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While initially the Meiklejohn approach embraced a narrow view of 
“public” speech, his boundaries of which types of speech involve “self-
governance” grew more permeable under pressure. Ultimately, Meiklejohn 
conceded that his newer view of “public debate” included any form of 
expression from which a voter might gain knowledge or understanding of 
others.126 He explained that “the people do need novels and dramas and 
paintings and poems, ‘because they will be called upon to vote.’”127 This 
expanded view of “public” speech raised difficult questions about the 
usefulness to self-governance of speech like commercial advertising, 
pornography, campaign contributions, or hate speech. At what point, other 
scholars began to ask, does the definition of “public” speech become so 
expansive that it ceases to have any effective meaning? Professor Kalven 
noted the easy progression from speech about public issues to speech 
about pretty much anything.128 Despite these problematic questions, the 
Meiklejohn concept that political speech lies at the center of all First 
Amendment protection has endured.129 
In an effort to rein back in the expanding ground protected by self-
governance scholars, others attempted again to tie the purpose of free 
speech directly to public debate. The most extreme of these approaches is 
that proposed by then-Professor Robert Bork. Bork argued that to avoid 
“an analogical stampede” the First Amendment’s protection of free speech 
must be cut off at explicitly political speech and no more.130 Under his 
view, there is no constitutional protection for educational, commercial, 
scientific, or artistic speech because the benefits of these types of speech 
are no greater than the benefits derived from a range of other non-speech 
conduct that potentially is subject to restrictions passed by the legislative 
branch.131 Bork saw nothing in the First Amendment that required more. 
While most First Amendment scholars considered Bork’s theory drastic 
and unconvincing,132 others agreed that the goal of protecting political 
 
 
 126. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 256–
57. 
 127. Id. at 263. 
 128. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221. 
 129. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (referring to political speech as “the 
core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect”); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: 
A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 n.33 and citations therein (“The first amendment theory 
adopted by the Supreme Court frequently appears to track Meiklejohn’s views.”). 
 130. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 27 
(1971). 
 131. Id. at 28. 
 132. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the 
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 302 (1978) (noting that there is not “wide 
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debate should be the focus because of its societal importance. Professor 
Owen Fiss asserted that it is “collective self-determination” that should be 
the goal of free speech jurisprudence and the only relevant question should 
be whether the speech at issue adds to the public debate.133 According to 
Fiss, speech is and should be protected “when (and only when) it does 
[enrich the public debate], and precisely because it does, not because it is 
an exercise of autonomy.”134 Under Fiss’s theory, what the phrase “the 
freedom of speech” in the Constitution “refers to is a social state of affairs, 
not the action of an individual or institution.”135 Fiss’s approach rejects 
theories that he asserts were designed to protect “the street corner speaker” 
because such a theory that seems “so glorious when we have the street 
corner speaker in mind is largely unresponsive to the conditions of modern 
society.”136 In a modern world where communication channels and 
agendas are often controlled by media corporate conglomerates, Fiss’s 
approach questions the premise that simply leaving individuals free to 
discuss issues will create a robust public debate.137  
3. Fostering Democracy 
Closely related to the goal of effective self-governance through 
political debate is the idea that free speech fosters democracy. It does so 
by allowing for a diversity of opinions, creating a more tolerant citizenry, 
and protecting the voices of dissenters. The stabilizing effect of allowing 
all segments of society to speak and be heard enhances a true democracy. 
Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that promoting a diversity of 
opinions is essential to securing a true democracy, even if such a system 
requires more—not fewer—regulations on speech.138 Under Sunstein’s 
view, increased government regulation of the communication media might 
be necessary to protect minority voices. He explained: “Such controls 
could promote both political deliberation and political equality. In such 
reforms, I contend, lies the best hope for keeping faith with time-honored 
principles of democratic self-government under modern conditions.”139 
 
 
acceptance for the logical inference from [the relationship between freedom of speech and the 
democratic process] that in principle the amendment is limited to political speech”). 
 133. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986). 
 134. Id. at 1411. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1409. 
 137. Id. at 1410. 
 138. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH xix, 17–92 (1995). 
 139. Id. at xix. 
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Whether additional regulations are needed or not, several society-based 
scholars agree with the goal of protecting diverse viewpoints and ensuring 
that the views of minority groups, whose opinions and beliefs might 
otherwise be waylaid by a more homogeneous majority, are included in 
the public debate. Democracy, ultimately, is the primary beneficiary of 
these protections. 
Professor Lee Bollinger has argued that securing a diversity of 
viewpoints promises to encourage tolerance throughout society and that 
this is the primary value protected by the First Amendment.140 By 
removing the power of some to squelch the speech of others, Bollinger’s 
theory contends, the First Amendment forces people to tolerate the 
contrasting beliefs and viewpoints of others. Without the power to censor, 
Americans must look inward at their own prejudices and confront “the 
fears and angers [they] bear towards the contrary beliefs and behavior of 
others.”141 Thus, under Bollinger’s theory, free speech protections function 
first and foremost to stop the societal urge to silence minorities and, as a 
result, create by example a greater societal tolerance for speech and non-
speech differences. As Bollinger explained: 
Providing some accommodation of these varied beliefs is a critical 
and basic task of the society. Simply coexisting and overcoming the 
wish to establish an overly homogenized society are important 
goals. In this sense, free speech may simply function as a zone of 
extreme toleration, not because the behavior tolerated is important 
to human self-realization or to truth, but because as a practical 
matter living with divergent behavior is necessary.142 
The flip side of Bollinger’s view is found in Professor Steven Shiffrin’s 
theory that the First Amendment is mostly concerned with the protection 
of “romantics—those who would break out of classical forms: the 
dissenters, the unorthodox, the outcasts.”143 Shiffrin’s view is the mirror 
image of Bollinger’s. While Bollinger adopted a defensive view that 
focuses on preventing majority censorship of the minority, Shiffrin took an 
offensive approach that is concerned with championing minority speech. 
Shiffrin argued: “The first amendment’s purpose and function in the 
American polity is not merely to protect negative liberty, but also 
 
 
 140. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 9–10, 140–44 (1986). 
 141. Bollinger, supra note 122, at 445. 
 142. Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 984 
(1990). 
 143. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 5 (1990). 
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affirmatively to sponsor the individualism, the rebelliousness, the 
antiauthoritarianism, the spirit of nonconformity within all of us.”144 
Whether accepting an offensive or defensive approach, these newer 
critics of the marketplace of ideas share Mill’s goal of free expression for 
all opinions as a means to a more effective democracy. But to fulfill that 
ideal vision, they argue, the focus should be on protecting the voices of 
those who might otherwise be silenced whether based on economics, 
education, class, race, religion, gender, or other factors.  
In summary, the society-based free speech theorists often disagree on 
what types of speech should be protected and, moreover, how to protect 
them effectively. Yet they find common ground in what they see as the 
primary goals of the First Amendment protections of free speech—a rich 
public debate that results in an informed citizenry and a successful 
democracy through exposure to diverse viewpoints from a wide variety of 
speakers. In this manner, society as a whole reaps the rewards of free and 
open expression.  
B. Individual-Based Theories of Free Speech 
A distinct collection of theories on free speech principles finds the 
value of the First Amendment lies predominately with the individual. 
Under this line of reasoning, the right to speak freely is “justified not 
because it provides a benefit to society, but because it is a primary 
good.”145 The beneficiaries under this view are the speakers and their 
listeners, who are free to exercise individual autonomy and pursue self-
realization without constraints. Focusing on the individual benefits of free 
speech allows the theorists to encompass a broad range of personal 
expression. This is because they see the desire, the freedom, and the act of 
self-expression as themselves worthwhile benefits regardless of any 
societal gains these freedoms might yield. 
Based on an Aristotelian view of happiness, this theory contends that 
“[f]ree expression may be an indispensable means to the good life; free 
speech may be necessary to human flourishing or happiness.”146 While the 
society-based theorists concerned themselves with the self-governance of 
the citizenry, the individual-based scholars focus on the right of each 
human being to make choices and control his or her world through 
 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 50 (1982). 
 146. Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 79 (1989). 
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individual actions, thoughts, and speech. The key word is “autonomy.” As 
Professor Charles Fried explained: 
Freedom of expression is properly based on autonomy: the Kantian 
right of each individual to be treated as an end in himself, an equal 
sovereign citizen of the kingdom of ends with a right to the greatest 
liberty compatible with the like liberties of all others. Autonomy is 
the foundation of all basic liberties, including liberty of 
expression.147 
To some of these scholars, the inquiry ends here; freedom of speech is 
a necessary right of an individual to be free from the control of others. It is 
the power of choice and of action and an essential component of liberty. 
These theorists, according to Schauer “claim to intuit the intrinsic 
goodness of free speech.”148 Professor Ronald Dworkin is a strong 
proponent of this view and rejects any view that “treats free speech as 
important instrumentally, that is, not because people have any intrinsic 
moral right to say what they wish, but because allowing them to do so will 
produce good effects for the rest of us.”149 
Other individual-based theorists, however, do see free speech as a 
means to an end and have focused on the positive consequences it 
provides to individuals. Their answer to the question of why to protect free 
speech comes in a thesaurus of phrases such as self-fulfillment,150 self-
realization,151 self-actualization,152 or self-determination.153 These scholars 
submit that the freedom of speech is valuable to individuals because it is a 
necessary path toward personal growth and the development of reason.154 
Professor Lawrence Solum explained: 
Speech (or more precisely, communication) is a prerequisite for the 
development of this potential. Man is a social animal; 
communication is required for individuals to grow, to become 
fulfilled, and to develop their rational faculties. Thus, the status of 
 
 
 147. Charles Fried, Speech in the Welfare State: The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A 
Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992). 
 148. SCHAUER, supra note 145, at 48. 
 149. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 199–200 (1996) (emphasis omitted). 
 150. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970). 
 151. MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 9–40 (1984); Vincent 
Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 523, 524 (1977). 
 152. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 254 (1989). 
 153. Id. at 3–5, 47–51, 69. 
 154. SCHAUER, supra note 145, at 49–50. 
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self-realization as an essential part of the good life requires the 
freedom to communicate.155 
While typically centered in the speaker, these benefits also affect the 
listener who is empowered with the ability to choose which speakers to 
hear and to judge the value of the messages.156  
One main point on which these individual-based scholars diverge from 
the society-based theorists is the necessity, or propriety, of examining the 
content of the speech to determine its level of protection. Professor Martin 
Redish explained that “a government determination that one type of 
expression fosters this value better than another is itself a rejection of the 
self-realization principle.”157 The opposing view is expressed by society-
based scholar Professor Fiss who concluded that content regulations are 
necessary and that individual autonomy “might have to be sacrificed, to 
make certain that public debate is sufficiently rich to permit true collective 
self-determination.”158  
C. Multi-Valued Theories of Free Speech 
Professor Harry Kalven once puzzled as to why free speech concepts 
suffer under the weight of a “quest for coherent general theory”159 while 
other areas of the law freely enjoy “a great capacity to tolerate 
inconsistencies.”160 This urge to define a single overarching rationale for 
free speech has itself led to much scholarly pontification on speech and its 
proper role in society. In his discussion of the various justifications for 
free speech, for example, Professor Kent Greenawalt challenged the single 
rationale approach and concluded that humans struggle with speech issues 
as they do with other problems—by balancing numerous factors and 
values.161 
Thus while many free speech scholars tend to accept primarily either a 
society-based or an individual-based view of the First Amendment, there 
are also those who are willing to accept that a multitude of rationales are at 
play. For example, Professor Schauer expressed sympathy for an 
interdependent approach that takes into account multiple justifications, 
 
 
 155. Solum, supra note 146, at 80 (footnotes omitted). 
 156. Id. 
 157. REDISH, supra note 151, at 5. 
 158. Fiss, supra note 135, at 1411. 
 159. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4 (1965). 
 160. Id. 
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stating that “although there need not be anything inherently wrong with a 
unitary theory, so, too, there need not be anything wrong with a multi-
valued theory.”162 He envisioned an approach where “we might in fact 
have several first amendments.”163 Another view was taken by Professor 
Michael Perry who concluded that both justifications are proper because 
they “are congruent with one another; neither category is smaller nor 
larger than the other. They are one category.”164 Philosopher John Stuart 
Mill also recognized a congruence between the two theories and noted that 
freedom of expression is unique among human liberties because the 
individual interest and societal interests are “inseparable.”165 
Professor Thomas Emerson is perhaps the main proponent of the idea 
that all of the values discussed in the preceding sections are proper 
justifications for constitutional protections and that they complement each 
other, rather than conflict.166 On this basis, he outlined four main 
justifications for the protection of expression—the discovery of truth, the 
fostering of democracy, the protection of individual autonomy, and the 
promotion of a more stable, tolerant society.167  
It is not the purpose of this Article to enter the debate about which 
justification for the protection of free speech is correct. The point of the 
preceding discussion, rather, was to get a sense of the range of proposed 
rationales. In order to discern the First Amendment value of 
autobiographical speech, and therefore how it should be balanced against 
competing interests, it is important to understand why speech is protected 
at all. The next Part examines how autobiographical speech fits into these 
common objectives. 
III. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SPEECH UNDER THE MAIN FREE SPEECH 
THEORIES 
The theoretical debate leaves us with no answer to the question of why 
the First Amendment protects free speech. But the debate has produced 
two prominent lines of thought—either the Constitution’s primary aim is 
to protect speech that benefits society or, alternatively, it is to safeguard 
speech that is important to the individual. Certain types of speech strongly 
 
 
 162. Schauer, supra note 110, at 1303. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1137, 1143 (1983). 
 165. MILL, supra note 115, at 14. 
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 167. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 905 West book Pages.doc9/11/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
932 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:905 
 
 
 
 
satisfy both rationales. The primary example is political speech, which is 
uniformly accepted as premium-level speech and oft said to deserve 
heightened protection.168 Similarly, a line of authority has developed that 
protects speech found to be “newsworthy” or about a matter in the public 
interest from various legal challenges.169 This Part takes a closer look at 
autobiographical speech and reveals that, like these other highly protected 
categories of speech, autobiographical speech advances the range of free 
speech goals by producing numerous benefits to both the individual 
speaker and society. These unique, multi-faceted benefits of 
autobiographical speech have been long recognized in the areas of history, 
philosophy, science, and religion, but for some reason remain overlooked 
in the law. This analysis shows why the time has come for legal 
recognition of the importance of autobiographical speech. 
A. The Questionable Nature of “Truthful” Autobiographical Speech 
Before going further, it is worthwhile to note that this discussion 
considers only truthful autobiographical speech. This phrase might strike 
some as an oxymoron. As biographer Humphrey Carpenter once said, 
“autobiography is probably the most respectable form of lying.”170 Indeed, 
it is generally accepted that autobiography is often used (or abused) as a 
forum for reinterpreting life events in a way more favorable way to the 
speaker. But it is also arguable that listeners of these stories tend to 
understand this tendency to reinvent or reshape past events and they take it 
into account when judging the truthfulness of the story. Although this 
Article assumes the veracity of the speech in question is not challenged, 
the issue of truthfulness of autobiographical speech is an interesting one 
deserving a brief discussion.  
It is always a difficult and unsatisfying endeavor to attempt to separate 
truth from falsity. This difficult effort becomes even more complex with 
autobiographical speech because it is driven primarily by memories of 
relationships and events. The interaction between first-person viewpoints, 
memory, and truth is not always absolute. In his book on memoirs, 
William Zinsser explained that autobiographical speakers “arrive at a truth 
that is theirs alone, not quite like that of anybody else who was present at 
 
 
 168. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 414 (1886) (stating that with “‘core political speech’ 
. . . First Amendment protection is at its zenith”). 
 169. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light that Failed, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 379 n.81 and citations therein (discussing the development of the newsworthiness 
privilege in privacy cases). 
 170. Humphrey Carter, Patrick White Explains Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1982, at 79. 
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the same events.”171 An example from American history of this 
phenomenon is found in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. 
While there were dozens, perhaps hundreds, of known eyewitnesses to the 
shooting, the stories conflicted on key points—some claimed they saw 
smoke from the grassy knoll,172 others did not;173 some reported hearing 
shots from different directions,174 others insisted they all came from the 
Texas Book Depository.175 Yet are these speakers lying?  
This ambiguity over the truth or falsity of memories is even more 
pronounced when the stories involve not just provable facts but human 
relationships, emotions, or reactions.176 For these reasons, Professor Albert 
Stone noted, “autobiography asks to be judged skeptically as a version of 
history.”177 The amount of leeway the proclaimed truth of 
autobiographical speech might deserve as compared to other types of 
statements is not obvious. As Professor Diane Zimmerman explained: 
Human beings regularly recall experiences and relationships in 
forms that make them more exciting, less painful, or in other ways 
more satisfying to their deep-seated needs. Even though, on 
occasion, this reshaping may alter our stories in ways that are not 
entirely fair to others who have been involved, we do not ordinarily 
consider this to be seriously immoral behavior.178  
Thus, there might be argument that there is something uniquely 
valuable about individual memories, perceptions, and viewpoints on 
personal life events regardless of their verifiable accuracy. Under this 
view, autobiographical speech might be deserving of protection beyond 
the boundaries of basic defamation law. But this inquiry, as stated earlier, 
goes outside the scope of this Article. Perhaps the concept intended in this 
initial Article would be more accurately described as “sincere” 
autobiographical speech, meaning simply speech in which the speaker 
genuinely believes its authenticity. At points, this Article does use the 
word “sincere” to make this point. Nevertheless this Article generally 
refers to “truthful” autobiographical speech and intends statements that are 
 
 
 171. William Zinsser, Introduction to INVENTING THE TRUTH 1, 6 (William Zinsser ed., 1998). 
 172. See, e.g., Larry A. Sneed, No More Silence (1998) (statement of Sam Holland). 
 173. See, e.g., id. at 79 (statement of Clemon Earl Johnson). 
 174. See, e.g., id. (statement of Marvin Faye Chism). 
 175. See, e.g., id. (statement of Robert E. (Bob) Edwards). 
 176. See Zimmerman, supra note 169, at 419 (discussing how memory and descriptions of 
relationships may not be necessarily true or false). 
 177. STONE, supra note 69, at 5. 
 178. Zimmerman, supra note 169, at 426. 
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believed to be true by the speaker and not challenged for their accuracy by 
others. 
B. Autobiographical Speech Under Individual-Based Theories 
In examining how autobiographical speech satisfies the various 
justifications for free speech, this Part first addresses the individual-based 
theories because the fit is more intuitive. This argument is also easier in 
part because the individual-based theories tend to find value in a broader 
spectrum of speech than the society-based approaches. But as the 
discussion shows, even under the more specific individual-based rationales 
that free speech leads to self-fulfillment and development of reason, the 
harmony between these goals and autobiographical speech is exceptionally 
compelling. The correlation is far more convincing than simply that all 
free speech aids in self-realization. Rather, autobiographical speech in 
particular has unique scientific, philosophic, religious, and legal backing 
to the claim that it leads to individual self-determination. At the end of this 
discussion, the conclusion is quite clear; if free speech receives 
constitutional protection because, as Professor Schauer concluded, it is 
capable of leading to “personal growth, self-fulfillment, and development 
of the rational faculties,”179 then autobiographical speech should not 
simply be protected: it should be one of the most treasured types of all 
human speech. 
1. “I Was Here”: Autobiographical Speech as Basic Human Freedom 
The least complex of the individual-based theories is the Kantian 
approach that free speech is simply a good unto itself. This viewpoint 
suggests that free speech must be protected because it is a necessary 
component of human liberty.180 The content of the speech and any value 
that might be derived from the subject matter are irrelevant. It is the 
freedom to express oneself that is vital. Therefore, proponents of this 
theory would protect essentially all types of speech with only rare 
exceptions.181 Clearly, autobiographical speech easily meets this standard 
and would deserve full protection under this theory.  
But the correlation between the Kantian view of free expression and 
autobiographical speech goes further. Under a view that free speech is an 
 
 
 179. SCHAUER, supra note 145, at 49. 
 180. See supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text. 
 181. See id. 
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innate right and part of what it means to be human and alive, protecting 
autobiographical speech is fundamental. Many famous philosophers have 
promoted the practice of exploring and sharing personal experiences as a 
method of testing and questioning our very existence—an essential part of 
being a self-conscious human. The philosopher Rene Descartes relied on 
his self-reflective dialogue with himself to conclude his own existence and 
declare “cogito ergo sum” or “I am thinking, therefore I exist.”182 This 
idea of self-reflection being the essence of humanity was adopted by 
several prominent philosophers, including Socrates who is quoted as 
saying “the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being.”183 
Friedrich Nietzsche concluded that regardless of knowledge or education 
ultimately “man carr[ies] away nothing but [his] own biography.”184 
Philosopher and theologian Saint Augustine discussed the importance of 
spending time “in the vast hall of my memory,” because that is where “I 
meet myself and recall what I am, what I have done, and when and where 
and how I was affected when I did it.”185 In his book discussing modern 
American culture of self-examination and disclosure, Professor Peter 
Brooks noted that “[w]ithout confessional talk, one might say, you simply 
don’t exist.”186  
In addition to the philosophical desire to comprehend their own 
existence, many speakers tie autobiographical speech with the human 
desire to thwart death. The writer Aram Saroyan described the urge to 
leave behind evidence of our life experiences as a “kind of willed 
immortality” and the same drive that causes people to “write[] [our] 
name[s] over and over and over again.”187 The theme of immortality—
both the hope to achieve it as well as to influence it—are common in 
discussions of autobiography. These life-examining functions of 
autobiographical speech, whether they are dialogues on innermost 
thoughts or boastful records for future generations, are literally the acts of 
leaving a mark on the world and declaring, “I was here.” According to 
Nietzsche, every great philosophy is “a kind of involuntary and 
 
 
 182. RENE DESCARTES, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 195 (John Cottingham et 
al. trans., Cambridge 1985). 
 183. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS 15 (1989). 
 184. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN, I 269 (Gary Handwerk trans., Stanford 
1997) (1878).  
 185. SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 186–87 (Henry Chadwick trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) 
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unconscious memoir.”188 Autobiographical speech is thus particularly 
harmonious with the existential view of free speech, which equates the 
freedom of expression with personhood. In the words of Justice Thurgood 
Marshall: “The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity 
but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-
expression.”189 
2. Autobiographical Speech Promotes Self-Realization 
Most individual-based theorists, however, defend free speech not as an 
innate human right but rather as a means to achieve the myriad benefits 
that accompany unrestrained personal expression.190 These benefits 
include self-fulfillment, self-realization, and the development of reason.191 
As with the Kantian approach, scholars taking the self-realization view 
argue that virtually all types of speech can play a role in an individual’s 
quest for fulfillment and, therefore, should not be censored.192 Once more, 
however, a look at the personal benefits gained by autobiographical speech 
shows that autobiographical speech far exceeds other types of speech in its 
capacity to advance this goal. Many of the forms of autobiographical 
speech discussed in this section are traditionally private forms of speech. 
Yet as the discussion of the new “tell-all” era in Part I demonstrated, 
increasingly more people now desire to make their personal stories public, 
and they are finding increased benefits in this open disclosure. Individual-
based theorist Professor Solum agrees that self-realization benefits come 
from being both a speaker and a listener because “[a]lthough one could 
develop one’s rational faculties to some extent by talking to one’s self, 
intellectual growth is far more rapid and perhaps more extensive if 
accomplished through interaction with others.”193 Regardless of whether 
the speaker chooses a public or private forum, the self-realization benefits 
of autobiographical speech have been established.  
 
 
 188. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 13 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage 
1989). 
 189. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 190. See supra notes 150–56 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 150–56 and accompanying text. 
 192. These individual-based theorists, however, do not necessarily object to all restrictions on 
speech. As Professor Redish stated, there is “no logically necessary link between a belief in individual 
self-realization and a so-called ‘absolute’ construction of the first amendment.” REDISH, supra note 
151, at 53. 
 193. Solum, supra note 146, at 80. 
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a. The “Talking Cure”: Therapeutic Benefits of Autobiographical 
Speech 
The curative benefits of human beings talking about life events are well 
accepted. Autobiographical speech, in fact, is the basic theory behind 
psychotherapy. Philosophy Professor J.M. Bernstein explained that 
“[t]herapy just is, in part, the constructing of a narrative, the making of a 
generalized biography into a specific autobiographical tale.”194 Thus the 
scientific and medical communities fully recognize the benefits of treating 
patients through an exploration of their self-history, according to Dr. 
Susan Vaughan, an instructor in clinical psychiatry at the Columbia 
College of Physicians and Surgeons, because there is “solid scientific 
evidence to suggest that the so-called ‘talking cure,’ originally devised by 
Freud, literally alters the way in which the neurons in the brain are 
connected to one another.”195 Vaughan explained that psychiatrists ask 
patients to tell and retell the stories of their lives because 
the value of understanding our life story is simply that it is our life 
story. It captures something key about who we are and how we 
came to be. With self-understanding comes autonomy. The story of 
your life is something you will always have, something that defines 
you. No one can take it away.196  
Psychoanalyst Roy Schafer contends that the retelling of a life story is 
at the core of psychoanalysis, because forcing the patient to synthesize life 
events reveals important information about the patient and brings about 
acceptance and understanding of past events and possible solutions for 
future problems.197 Discussing Schafer’s theory, Vaughan states:  
This retelling ultimately allows us to synthesize a cohesive life 
narrative. It makes our history make sense, transforms it from a 
series of unintegrated fragments of plots into a magnum opus. In 
providing us with an opportunity to integrate disparate elements of 
our autobiographies, all depth therapies such as psychoanalysis 
allow us to conquer the past and move toward the future with a new 
sense of mastery.198 
 
 
 194. J.M. Bernstein, Self-Knowledge as Praxis, in NARRATIVE IN CULTURE 51, 56 (Christopher 
Nash ed., Routledge 1991). 
 195. SUSAN C. VAUGHAN, THE TALKING CURE 4 (Henry Holt & Co. 1998) (1997). 
 196. Id. at 159. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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These recognized therapeutic benefits of autobiographical speech can 
be found beyond the psychologist’s couch. The practice of personal 
journaling or the writing of diaries is generally believed to bring similar 
healing results.199 The claimed psychological benefits of a person 
exploring a personal narrative are many and include finding insights into 
personality, releasing emotions, understanding the influence of a person’s 
family and childhood on his or her current life, escaping ruts and bad 
habits, coping with stressful situations like divorce or death, gaining the 
ability to forgive, goal making, problem solving, expanding creativity, and 
enhancing relationships with others.200 The magazine devoted to the topic, 
Personal Journaling: Writing About Your Life, summed it up well with the 
declaration “write your way to a better you.”201  
The therapeutic aspect of autobiographical speech—of telling one’s 
story and being heard—is also often an issue in the American legal 
system. To most Americans, allowing all sides the opportunity to tell their 
story in a legal conflict is nothing short of a vital “right” that is cathartic 
and inherently fair. Grand jury proceedings, for example, have been 
criticized for denying the defendant “the opportunity to testify and thus to 
tell his story to the grand jury.”202 Similarly, the ability of a crime victim 
to tell her story publicly is a major objective of the “victim’s rights” 
movement. Groups supporting a constitutional amendment on victim’s 
rights have argued for a victim’s right “to tell the judge and convicted 
criminal the physical, emotional and financial impact of the misdeeds.”203 
Empirical evidence suggests that litigants are “more likely to be satisfied 
with an adverse outcome and think the process fair if they are given a 
chance to participate personally and ‘tell their story’ to the 
decisionmaker.”204 Thus including these personal stories in the legal 
process creates positive effects by giving the speaker control, whether 
perceived or actual, over their own situation. 
These broad therapeutic benefits of autobiographical speech are in 
complete accord with the self-realization approach to free speech. 
 
 
 199. See, e.g., IRA PROGOFF, AT A JOURNAL WORKSHOP 5–18 (explaining the benefits his 
“extensive journal” program can yield). 
 200. See, e.g., JOYCE CHAPMAN, JOURNALING FOR JOY 10–11 (Newcastle 1991). 
 201. PERSONAL JOURNALING (Aug. 2003). 
 202. Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal 
Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 60 (2002). 
 203. Andrea F. Siegel, Crime Victims, Families Demand a Voice: Proposed Amendment Would 
Give Them a Say in Court, BALT. SUN, Nov. 5, 1993, at 1B, 4B. 
 204. Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of 
Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 506 (2003). 
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According to Professor Redish, self-realization is the “one true value” of 
First Amendment protections.205 The term as Redish used it has two 
general meanings. The first regards “development of the individuals’ 
powers and abilities.”206 This is in line with proponents of 
autobiographical speech who claim that it forces the speaker to find and 
further his individual qualities and makes him “more courageous, more 
authentic and more alive.”207 The second meaning of “self-realization,” 
according to Redish, refers to “the individual’s control of his or her own 
destiny through making life-affecting decisions.”208 This also comports 
with the claim that autobiographical speech gives speakers “a clearer sense 
. . . of what is and is not within [their] control” and allows them to seize 
control of their lives “before it’s really too late, maybe[, to] make dramatic 
changes.”209 Thus if speech is protected, as Redish claims, because of its 
“instrumental value in developing individuals’ mental faculties so that 
they may reach their full intellectual potential” and thereby better control 
their lives,210 then autobiographical speech deserves one of the strongest 
constitutional shields. 
b. Saving the Soul: Religion and Autobiographical Speech 
Autobiographical speech also has a strong religious tradition.211 In 
general terms, the religious practices involving autobiographical speech 
ask their followers to engage in various forms of self-reflection as a means 
to gain spiritual renewal or, alternatively, to perform an accounting of 
one’s life before death in order to achieve salvation. For example, the 
Puritans kept diaries of the events of their daily lives in the belief that it 
would reveal signs of divine providence.212 The Puritan diarist “offered 
what purported to be an accurate, straightforward account of the soul’s 
progress.”213 Similarly, the Quakers wrote journals “in order to evaluate 
themselves in their spiritual development.”214 Professor Angelo Costanzo, 
 
 
 205. REDISH, supra note 151, at 11. 
 206. Id. 
 207. ROBERT ATKINSON, THE GIFT OF STORIES 51 (1995). 
 208. REDISH, supra note 151, at 11. 
 209. ATKINSON, supra note 207, at 52–53. 
 210. REDISH, supra note 151, at 30. 
 211. Some historians, in fact, credit the rise of Christianity and its emphasis on the self for 
creating the modern autobiographical form. See, e.g., van Rijn, supra note 58, at ix (“Autobiography in 
our modern sense did not exist before the days of Jesus, the Christ.”). 
 212. William Berry, Personal Politics: American Autobiography, 73 VA. Q. REV. 609 (1997), 
available at http://www.vqronline.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/7764. 
 213. Id. at 611. 
 214. ANGELO COSTANZO, SURPRIZING NARRATIVE: OLAUDAH EQUIANO AND THE BEGINNINGS OF 
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a prominent scholar on slave narratives, compared the early American 
religious form of autobiography with its secular counterpart, and stated:  
The narrator of a religious life emphasized his struggle to save his 
soul and then depicted his entrance into a spiritual community of 
shared values and goals. The secular autobiographer stressed his 
individual search for identity within the framework of society’s 
temporal institutions, such as those of government, business, and 
education.215 
While most discussions of the religious tradition of autobiography 
focus on Christianity, forms of autobiographical speech are found in 
religions around the world. Several Native American religions practiced 
public confessional rituals as a means of propitiation.216 The Jewish 
practice to seek forgiveness in the days prior to Yom Kippur also involves 
autobiographical speech seeking atonement.217 Buddhists monks in Tibet 
were found to have kept “secret autobiographies” in which they explored 
personal religious experiences.218 Medieval Japanese Buddhists also took 
an “extraordinary interest” in their pasts.219 For Buddhists who believe in 
reincarnation and the concept of “karma,” reflecting on the present life 
was an essential means to revealing insights into a former life.220  
Perhaps the most prevalent form of autobiographical speech found in 
religious practice, however, is the act of confession in which admitting 
past wrongs is taught as a path to religious salvation. In his book on 
confessions, Professor Peter Brooks explains that “[c]onfessional 
discourse is clearly the prototype of that typically modern form of writing 
we call autobiography—it is a fragment of autobiography.”221 Saint 
Augustine’s Confessions, in which he gives an accounting of his life and 
the role of his faith, is considered by some to be “the first great 
 
 
BLACK AUTOBIOGRAPHY 50 (1987).  
 215. Id. at 6. 
 216. See, e.g., ANN FIENUP-RIORDAN, BOUNDARIES AND PASSAGES: RULE AND RITUAL IN YUP’IK 
ESKIMO ORAL TRADITION 209–10, 345 (1995) (describing the Yup’ik Eskimo ritual of public 
confession for medical healing and social control). 
 217. See, e.g., DOV PERETZ ELKINS, YOM KIPPUR READINGS 68 (Jewish Lights 2005) (discussing 
the practice of vidui, or confession, and “the healing that comes from telling ourselves the truth about 
our real intentions and, finally, self-acceptance. This does not mean that we are now proud of who we 
were or what we did, but it does mean that we have taken what we did back into ourselves, 
acknowledged it as part of ourselves. . . .”). 
 218. GYATSO, supra note 63, at 101–24.  
 219. Tsvetana Kristeva, Japanese Lyrical Diaries and the European Autobiographical Tradition, 
in EUROPE INTERPRETS JAPAN 157–60 (Gordon Daniels ed., 1984). 
 220. Id. 
 221. BROOKS, supra note 70, at 102. 
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introspective autobiography.”222 Before his execution by the Nazis in 
1945, Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote about the importance of public 
confession in Christianity: 
In confession the break-through to community takes place. . . . The 
unexpressed must be openly spoken and acknowledged. All that is 
secret and hidden is made manifest. It is a hard struggle until the sin 
is openly admitted.223  
Clearly the most prominent religious tradition of confession is found in 
Catholicism, which has required its followers to confess their sins since 
1215.224 While now considered a private, individual act, Christian 
religious confession was once seen as a public, community exercise.225 
The Catholic act of confession both comforts believers and regulates their 
behavior. As Brooks explained, it has become “a crucial mode of self 
examination; . . . a dominant form of self-expression, one that bears 
special witness to personal truth.”226 Beyond religious ritual, Brooks 
argued that confession “permeates our culture, including our educational 
practices and our law.”227  
The line between religious confession and therapeutic self-reflection is 
often blurry. For example, a period of apology to those who were wronged 
is a central part to any classic “twelve-step” program such as Alcoholics 
Anonymous,228 which combines religious and therapeutic approaches.229 
 
 
 222. Van Rijn, supra note 58, at ix. 
 223. DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, LIFE TOGETHER 112 (Harper & Row 1978). 
 224. BROOKS, supra note 70, at 2. 
 225. Id. at 91. 
 226. Id. at 9. 
 227. Id. at 2. Indeed, the subject of criminal confession in the law is a controversial one. Yet while 
there is intense debate over how confessions should be obtained and used by law enforcement officers 
and the courts, the idea that there is inherent value in a person being free to tell his story is not 
challenged. In the most famous confession case, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the 
Supreme Court justices disagreed with each other over the proper procedure but they were in accord 
regarding the desirability of voluntary, truthful confessions. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
Earl Warren declared that the protective warnings outlined in the case would “enable the defendant 
under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear.” Id. at 466. While disagreeing 
on the need for constitutionally mandated warnings, in his dissent in Miranda Justice Byron White 
similarly recognized a personal value in confession, stating, “it is by no means certain that the process 
of confessing is injurious to the accused. To the contrary it may provide psychological relief and 
enhance the prospects of rehabilitation.” Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting). Much like the religious 
view, the legal system considers voluntary confession as a crucial means to the discovery of truth and 
the possible redemption of the speaker. 
 228. See, e.g., AA WORLD SERVICES, INC., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 59 (4th ed. 2001). In 
Alcoholics Anonymous step five of the program instructs the follower to admit to others “the exact 
nature of [his] wrongs,” step eight requires an accounting of all persons whom he has harmed, step 
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As Brooks observed, “[p]sychoanalysis, one of the most conspicuous 
inventions of the twentieth century, offers a secular version of religious 
confession: it insists on the work of patient and analyst—comparable to 
confessant and confessor—toward the discovery of the most hidden truths 
about selfhood.”230 
As with psychotherapy, the correlation between the religious practices 
of autobiographical speech and the self-realization justification for First 
Amendment free speech protection is manifest. The religious view of 
autobiographical speech is that examination of past experiences—whether 
public or private and whether for self-reflection or confession of past 
wrongs—helps the speaker gain insight into himself, his life, and his world 
and aids him in making future choices that will lead to redemption. As the 
philosopher Foucault observed, the ritual of confession is one in which 
“the expression alone, independently of its external consequences, 
produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it: it 
exonerates, redeems, and purifies him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, 
liberates him, and promises him salvation.”231 
Therefore, under a theory that a constitutional shield for speech “is 
justified by the role speech plays in the processes of self-fulfillment, 
participation in change, development of personal faculties, and control of 
one’s own life-affecting decisions,”232 religious tradition supports the 
argument that protection of autobiographical speech is paramount for 
meeting these objectives.  
The blend between the philosophical, therapeutic, and religious uses of 
autobiographical speech corresponds directly with the individual-based 
justifications of the First Amendment. All of these approaches embrace the 
concept that having the freedom to explore the details of one’s life leads 
the speaker to understand herself and her world and, in turn, guides her to 
make better choices. None of these practices, moreover, makes much of a 
 
 
nine instructs the follower to make amends to these people whenever possible, and step ten instructs 
him to promptly admit when he is wrong. Id.  
 229. Id. The program in step two asks the follower to admit that “a Power greater than ourselves 
could restore us to sanity” and in step three instructs the follower to turn his will and his life “over to 
the care of God as we understood Him.” Other steps ask the follower to turn to God for help in 
remedying character defects. Step eleven states that the follower will have “[s]ought through prayer 
and meditation to improve [his] conscious contract with God as [he] underst[ands] Him, praying only 
for knowledge of His will for [him] and the power to carry that out.” Id.  
 230. BROOKS, supra note 70, at 9. 
 231. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 62 (Robert Hurley 
trans., Vintage 1990) (1978). 
 232. Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
615, 683 (1991) (footnotes omitted) (summarizing the “self-expression or self-realization theory” of 
free speech). 
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distinction between the basic (“I was born in January”), the dramatic (“I 
lied to my mother”), or the mundane (“I like toast”). Rather they accept 
that the true importance of these various statements might not be fully 
understood until they are spoken, and they give the speaker the power to 
determine their ultimate significance.  
The clear correlation with individual-based theories of free speech is 
evidenced by the overlap of terms used by both individual-based free 
speech theorists and autobiography scholars. For example, autobiography 
critic Karl Weintraub once described autobiographical speech as having 
“such varied functions as self-explication, self-discovery, self-
clarification, self-formation, self-presentation, [and] self-
justification”233—many of the same self-focused concepts advocated by 
individual-based free speech scholars. This suggests that autobiographical 
speech is an essential, if not preeminent, form of speech in the effort to 
protect an autonomous self-realization justification for free speech rights. 
C. Autobiographical Speech Under Society-Based Theories 
To anyone who accepts the individual-based theories of free speech, 
the strong parallel between the personal benefits of autobiographical 
speech and the goals of the First Amendment is unmistakable. The role of 
autobiographical speech under the society-based justifications is not as 
intuitive. A closer examination, however, reveals that autobiographical 
speech satisfies these alternative rationales with rival force. As discussed 
earlier, the society-based theorists believe that free speech is driven by the 
desire to discover the truth, improve self-governance through knowledge 
and debate, and foster democracy through increased understanding and 
tolerance of opposing views.234 This Part examines how truthful 
autobiographical speech furthers those goals by offering a unique forum 
for the public at large to hear a multitude of voices commenting on being 
human in America—the good, the bad, and even the seemingly banal. This 
conversation on the human condition enlightens people to the experiences, 
beliefs, and sufferings of others. This expanded knowledge of the realities 
of American lives provides society with the collective information it needs 
to better govern itself and allow democracy to flourish. There is little 
danger, of course, of losing the autobiographies of wealthy and influential 
Americans. The threat, rather, is that contemporary society will 
undervalue, and thus underprotect, the life stories of the powerless or 
 
 
 233. Weintraub, supra note 60, at 824. 
 234. See supra Part II.A. 
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nonconformist. These stories are at risk of being judged to be unimportant 
or else somehow objectionable and thus silenced. This distinction is 
unsettling because in many ways the stories of “ordinary” Americans have 
the greatest potential of furthering the society-based goals of free speech. 
1. Autobiographical Speech Leads Us Closer to the Truth 
The predominant theory supporting free speech protections is the one 
currently adopted by the Supreme Court: freedom of speech leads to the 
discovery of truth in the marketplace of ideas.235 The link between human 
life experiences and our understanding of truth is undeniable. As the 
German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey declared at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, all human knowledge arises out of individual human 
experiences.236 Therefore, autobiographical speech is vital to expanding 
human understanding of what is true.  
This Article is limited to an examination of the constitutional role of 
truthful autobiographical speech. As discussed briefly earlier, if the 
veracity of the speech is challenged, the analysis would likely change.237 
Truthful speech in general is highly valued by the First Amendment. In his 
analysis of the various justifications for free speech protections, Professor 
Greenawalt determined that general factual statements were the one type 
of communication that was covered by virtually every rationale. Factual 
assertions, he concluded, “are critical for people’s understanding of the 
world they inhabit, for their choices about how to live, and for their 
decisions on public issues.”238 Therefore, he found that the truth-seeking 
rationale of free speech “applies strongly to general factual statements.”239 
Any discussion of “truth” and “facts,” however, quickly hits the 
conceptual roadblock of whether objective truth actually exists. 
Greenawalt noted that “some notion of empirical truth” is generally 
accepted and suggested, as an example, that because all the “available 
evidence suggests that the earth is round rather than flat,” this allows 
people to “say that someone who believes that the earth is round is closer 
to the truth than the person who believes it to be flat.”240 But in his 
criticism of the “marketplace of ideas” theory, Professor Stanley Ingber 
 
 
 235. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 236. See WILHELM DILTHEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE HUMAN SCIENCES 81 (Ramon J. Betanzos 
trans., Wayne State Univ. Press 1988) (1923). 
 237. See supra Part III.A. 
 238. Greenawalt, supra note 161, at 154. 
 239. Greenawalt, supra note 161, at 154. 
 240. Greenawalt, supra note 161, at 132. 
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argued that “truth” is inherently subjective.241 Rather than accepting an 
objective or empirical truth, Ingber suggested that all truth is based on an 
individual’s personal experiences and backgrounds. He explained:  
If the marketplace actually revealed truth, diversity and conflict 
presumably would diminish rather than increase. But, because 
people’s perceptions are based on their varying interests and 
experiences, their perceptions are not likely to be socially 
homogenized. Consequently, as long as people have differing 
experiences, there is little guarantee that any society can agree on 
what is ‘true,’ and diversity and conflict will likely persist.242 
Ingber concluded that the marketplace of ideas is not likely to result in 
a general consensus of what is true, but rather “serves as a forum where 
cultural groups with differing needs, interests, and experiences battle to 
defend or establish their disparate senses of what is ‘true’ or ‘best.’”243 
Autobiographical speech is essential to advancing both objective and 
subjective “truth” discovery. Ingber’s view of subjective truth in which the 
marketplace allows diverse cultural groups to share their differing 
experiences is especially aligned with unfettered autobiographical speech 
rights. But autobiographical speech also furthers the discovery of the more 
objective view of truth. Any scientific, historical, or philosophical 
definition of “truth” usually relies on personal observation and experience. 
A dictionary definition of “fact” is “[k]nowledge or information based on 
real occurrences.”244 Similarly, the definition of “scientific fact” is “any 
observation that has been repeatedly confirmed and accepted as true.”245 
In other words, we draw “facts” about the world from human observations 
or experiences of real occurrences. Just as the philosopher Dilthey stated, 
human knowledge originates in particular human experiences.246 For 
example, the primary reason we accept as fact that a solar eclipse has 
occurred today is because we observed it happening. Similarly, we accept 
as fact that solar eclipses occurred in the past because ancient humans 
wrote down their personal experiences and observations when the sun 
went black. Some medical conditions such as “color-blindness” and 
 
 
 241. Ingber, supra note 129. 
 242. Ingber, supra note 129, at 25–26 (footnotes omitted). 
 243. Id. at 27. 
 244. Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=fact (emphasis added) (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2005). 
 245. Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=scientific%20fact (emphasis 
added) (last visited Aug. 28, 2005). 
 246. DILTHEY, supra note 236, at 81. 
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dyslexia, moreover, are recognized as fact, yet our knowledge of them 
must be based almost entirely on the personal stories of those who told 
others about what they saw and what they experienced. While we do not 
accept as empirical fact each individual story that is told, when enough 
people relate the same experiences we eventually accept them as factual. 
The anthropologist Margaret Mead wrote in her autobiography that “the 
essence of anthropological work is comparison.”247 In other words, 
scientific observation moves from the realm of the particular to the realm 
of the general and if the comparisons are constant, eventually the thesis is 
adopted as fact.  
This process of moving from the particular to the general based on 
human observations and experiences goes beyond purely scientific queries 
to include the discovery of broader truths about history, culture, and 
community. In other words, a society that allows its citizens to express 
freely their sincere personal observations of their lives, communities, and 
world maximizes the amount of observational information of real 
occurrences. From this information the truth will emerge. In this regard, 
autobiographical speech is invaluable in the quest for truth. For example, 
recorded accounts of survivors of the Nazi concentration camps lead us 
closer to the truth about the Holocaust. Letters from soldiers deployed 
abroad lead us closer to the truth about war. Diaries kept by early black 
Americans lead us closer to the truth about slavery.248 Testimonies of 
abused children and battered wives lead us closer to the truth about 
domestic violence. And, it therefore follows, even weblogs kept by young 
Capitol Hill staffers can lead us closer to the truth about contemporary 
youth culture and modern sexual ethics.249  
Far more significantly, moreover, first-person accounts of American 
life might eventually lead us closer to the truth about issues we cannot yet 
identify but will become known only with time. While it is unlikely that 
 
 
 247. MARGARET MEAD, BLACKBERRY WINTER: MY EARLIER YEARS 236 (Kodansha America 
1995) (1972). 
 248. See, e.g., Toni Morrison, The Site of Memory, in INVENTING THE TRUTH 183, 190 (William 
Zinsser ed., 1998) (discussing autobiographical narratives of American slaves and observing “no slave 
society in the history of the world wrote more—or more thoughtfully—about its own enslavement”). 
 249. Jessica Cutler’s story already has begun a debate about these issues as well as others such as 
whether Cutler was treated more harshly than the men with whom she was involved. See, e.g., 
Discussion on TalkLeft, http://talkleft.com/new_archives/007593.html (including comments such as 
“[w]hy isn’t the mainstream media all over the committee staffer who used his connections with the 
senator—and even worse, the senator’s office staff—to arrange paid-for trysts with a young staffer? 
He, and the others detailed in Jessica’s diary, should be the ones wearing the scarlet ‘A,’” and “[w]hy 
do these men get to keep their jobs? Nothing amazes me anymore with the exploits of those that 
govern.”) (on file with author). 
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early-American judges and legislators understood the significance of slave 
narratives, for example, these texts are now considered to be invaluable 
evidence of the truth of this country’s racist background. Accurate reports 
of all human experiences in some way add to the greater search for truth. 
Thus any restrictions on truthful autobiographical speech should come 
with the warning that they are also limiting our knowledge of the truth. 
The American legal system, moreover, recognizes the role 
autobiographical speech plays in the discovery of truth. In the most basic 
model of the adversarial system, the plaintiff tells his story, the defendant 
tells hers, and whichever is deemed more credible prevails as the truth. 
Seemingly influenced by John Milton’s view of truth colliding with 
falsity,250 the adversarial system adopts the belief that in a courtroom 
truthful testimony will prevail over falsehoods. While, of course, evidence 
other than first-person testimony also is utilized in the adversarial system, 
witness testimony of past events is the foundation of an American trial. 
The significance of first-hand accounts is seen in the strict rules of hearsay 
and is also behind a number of other legal tenets in some form including 
due process,251 the attorney-client privilege,252 jury rights, mediation and 
arbitration,253 the confrontation clause, and the right of a death penalty 
defendant to present mitigating evidence.254 
Permitting sincere first-person accounts of human experiences is one of 
the primary methods for a society to learn the facts about its people and 
their families, their goals, their beliefs, and their fears. These stories, 
moreover, lead us closer to the truths about government policies, the 
educational system, economic structure, criminal procedure, health issues, 
 
 
 250. Milton, supra note 114, at 45.  
 251. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797 n.4 (1996) (“The opportunity 
to be heard is an essential requisite of due process of law in judicial proceedings.”). 
 252. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (noting that the purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege “requires that clients be free to make full disclosure to their attorneys of past 
wrongdoings”) (quotation omitted). 
 253. See, e.g., Michal Alberstein, Negotiating for Justice, Fighting for Law: The Dialectic of 
Promoting and Settling Disputes in the Current Global Era, in 31 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND 
SOCIETY 64 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004) (stating that the analysis of a mediator is “a delicate quest into 
autobiography, social and environmental condition, cultural narratives, life stories and histories and the 
ways individuals process their disputes through these systems”); Richard Fullerton, Searching for 
Balance in Conflict Management: The Contractors’ Perspective, 60 DISP. RESOL. J. 48, 54 (Feb.–Apr. 
2005) (explaining that in mediation “[o]pposing parties usually present their positions to each other, 
allowing them to tell their story and feel that they have been heard”). 
 254. See, e.g., Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed to 
Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1345, 1384 (1994) (explaining that in requiring capital defendants 
be allowed to present mitigating evidence, “the [Supreme] Court recognized that the opportunity to 
humanize the defendant by telling his story is constitutionally required prior to imposition of a death 
sentence”). 
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and many other public concerns. “Reading another’s life story,” 
autobiography critic Albert Stone explained, is “to immerse oneself in 
human experience in all its interconnections and manifestations.”255 This 
important undertaking gives autobiographical speech a key role in the 
truth-seeking theories of free speech.  
2. “A Mosaic Portrait”: Understanding Our Collective Experience 
and History Aids Self-Governance 
A primary concern of the society-based theorists is the fostering of 
political debate in order to enhance self-governance. Meiklejohn argued 
that “[p]ublic discussion of public issues, together with the spreading of 
information and opinion bearing on those issues, must have a freedom 
unabridged by our agents.”256 Autobiographical speech, described by the 
philosopher Dilthey as “the germinal cell of history,”257 offers the purest 
method for collecting information on American experiences that 
eventually ripen into the public issues of the day. Autobiographical speech 
fills in the complexity, richness, and diversity of human experiences that 
are often omitted from the more formal public debate. It is, therefore, an 
essential freedom for a nation to successfully govern itself.  
In the Gettysburg Address, President Abraham Lincoln eloquently 
described the American political system as a “government of the people, 
by the people, for the people.”258 With this understanding of democracy, it 
is self-evident that a government that is so reliant on the informed choices 
of “the people” to guide it in a way that benefits “the people” would be 
greatly aided by hearing the varied experiences of “the people.” 
Autobiographical speech provides an insider’s view on American life from 
those who have experienced it first-hand. It provides necessary insights to 
current voters while building a record for future Americans about their 
past and current government. 
As mentioned in Part I, the tradition of autobiography has a long and 
pedigreed past. In what could be one of the longest footnotes in scholarly 
history if exploited, this Article could list the prominent and infamous 
persons who have written their autobiographies. The footnote would 
include politicians, scientists, musicians, teachers, athletes, social activists, 
 
 
 255. STONE, supra note 69, at 3. 
 256. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 123, at 257. 
 257. WILHELM DILTHEY, PATTERN AND MEANING IN HISTORY 89 (H.P. Rickman ed., Harper & 
Bros. 1962) (1961). 
 258. GARRY WILLIS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG 263 (Simon & Schuster 1993) (quoting the 
Gettysburg Address). 
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religious leaders, explorers, and poets. The variety of names would be 
astonishing, even perplexing, and include names such as Benjamin 
Franklin,259 Lee Iacocca,260 Martin Luther King, Jr.,261 Helen Keller,262 
Amy Fisher,263 Charles Darwin,264 Gandhi,265 Johnny Cash,266 Rosa 
Parks,267 Richard Simmons,268 Hank Aaron,269 Nancy Kerrigan,270 
Madeleine Albright,271 the Dalai Lama,272 Vanna White,273 and nearly 
every United States president.274  
The desire to write—and the appeal to read—autobiographies, 
however, does not belong only to the rich and famous. Mark Twain, who 
also wrote his autobiography,275 once said, “[t]here was never yet an 
uninteresting life.”276 In proof of his point, published autobiographies of 
the more “ordinary” person also are enjoying increasing commercial 
success. Recent examples include Tobias Wolff’s This Boy’s Life277 
chronicling his childhood with an abusive stepfather, Dave Pelzer’s 
triology of memoirs beginning with A Child Called It on his life as an 
abused child and struggles in foster care,278 and Dave Eggers’s memoir A 
 
 
 259. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (Dover Thrift 1996) 
(1850).  
 260. LEE IACOCCA, IACOCCA: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (Diane Pub. 1999) (1984). 
 261. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (Clayborne 
Carson ed., Warner 2001). 
 262. HELEN KELLER, THE STORY OF MY LIFE (Roger Shattuck ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2003).  
 263. AMY FISHER WITH SHEILA WELLER, AMY FISHER: MY STORY (Pocket 1993).  
 264. CHARLES DARWIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHARLES DARWIN 1809–1882 (Nora Barlow 
ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1993) (1958).  
 265. M.K. GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OR THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH 
(Mahadev H. Desai trans., Buccaneer 2005) (1927).  
 266. JOHNNY CASH WITH PATRICK CARR, CASH: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1997).  
 267. ROSA PARKS WITH JIM HASKINS, ROSA PARKS: MY STORY (1992).  
 268. RICHARD SIMMONS, STILL HUNGRY—AFTER ALL THESE YEARS: MY STORY (1999).  
 269. HENRY AARON WITH CONNIE WHEELER, I HAD A HAMMER: THE HANK AARON STORY 
(1991).  
 270. NANCY KERRIGAN WITH STEVE WOODWARD, NANCY KERRIGAN: IN MY OWN WORDS 
(1996).  
 271. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, MADAM SECRETARY (2003).  
 272. THE DALAI LAMA, MY LAND AND MY PEOPLE: THE ORIGINAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HIS 
HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA OF TIBET (Warner 1997). 
 273. VANNA WHITE, VANNA SPEAKS (1987).  
 274. See, e.g., BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE (2004); GEORGE BUSH, ALL THE BEST, GEORGE BUSH: 
MY LIFE IN LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS (1999); RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE (1990); 
JIMMY CARTER, AN HOUR BEFORE DAYLIGHT: MEMOIRS OF A RURAL BOYHOOD (2001).  
 275. MARK TWAIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK TWAIN (Charles Neider ed., Harper 
Perennial 2000). 
 276. enotes.com, http://history.enotes.com/famous-quotes/there-was-never-yet-an-uninteresting-
life-such-a/print (last visited Oct. 22, 2005). 
 277. TOBIAS WOLFF, THIS BOY’S LIFE: A MEMOIR (1989).  
 278. DAVE PELZER, A CHILD CALLED “IT” (1995).  
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Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius about his experiences raising 
his eight-year-old brother after the death of their parents.279 Oral historian 
Studs Terkel has gathered first-person accounts to bring attention to the 
“etceteras” of the world, as he has termed them, in his books such as 
Working,280 capturing the tales of blue-collar workers, and The Good 
War,281 which won the Pulitzer Prize for its collection of World War II 
memories. Perhaps the most famous autobiography of an “ordinary” 
person is the diary written by Anne Frank, a German-Jewish teenager, 
during the two years she and her family were forced into hiding from the 
Nazis during World War II.282 
The Supreme Court recognized the historical importance of 
autobiographical speech when it considered the constitutionality of so-
called “Son of Sam” laws that prohibited criminals from profiting by 
telling the stories of their crimes.283 In finding New York’s version of the 
statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, the Court observed:  
Had the Son of Sam law been in effect at the time and place of 
publication, it would have escrowed payment for such works as The 
Autobiography of Malcolm X, which describes crimes committed by 
the civil rights leader before he became a public figure; Civil 
Disobedience, in which Thoreau acknowledges his refusal to pay 
taxes and recalls his experience in jail; and even the Confessions of 
Saint Augustine, in which the author laments “my past foulness and 
the carnal corruptions of my soul,” one instance of which involved 
the theft of pears from a neighboring vineyard.284 
This concern with the possibility of silencing the life stories of such 
influential authors shows that the Court has recognized that trying to 
restrict the autobiographical speech of some speakers raises important 
historical implications. 
First-person stories like these and numerous others play a significant 
role in our understanding of history. Autobiography critic Albert Stone 
 
 
 279. DAVE EGGERS, A HEARTBREAKING WORK OF STAGGERING GENIUS (2000). 
 280. STUDS TERKEL, WORKING: PEOPLE TALK ABOUT WHAT THEY DO ALL DAY AND HOW THEY 
FEEL ABOUT WHAT THEY DO (New Press 1997) (1974). 
 281. STUDS TERKEL, THE GOOD WAR: AN ORAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II (New Press 1997) 
(1984); see Univ. of Chicago News Office, University of Chicago Pulitzer Prize Winners, http://www-
news.uchicago.edu/resources/Pulitzer/.  
 282. ANNE FRANK, ANNE FRANK: THE DIARY OF A YOUNG GIRL (Bantam 1993) (1947).  
 283. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. St. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
 284. Id. at 121 (citations omitted). 
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noted that “[a]ll the major intellectual and political events and crises of the 
moderns era are represented” in autobiography.285 He explained:  
Wars and other characteristic modes of American violence; 
immigration and the movement of Americans from country to city, 
from Southern farms to Northern ghettoes, abroad to Europe and 
Africa; the impact of science and technology upon all areas of life; 
the struggle against the color line and the emergence of the Third 
World; women’s emancipation from male definition of their rights 
and roles; new movements in art, architecture, literature, and the 
mass media; the Roaring Twenties, the Depression decade, and the 
strife-ridden 1960s—all these and many other social phenomena 
have been recreated as someone’s personal experience to be 
collectively shared by the curious audiences of autobiography.286 
Adopting the idea of autobiographical speech as historical record, 
several government and nonprofit organizations have worked or are 
working to preserve the previously untold life stories of Americans 
through audio and video recordings, personal interviews, and the written 
word. In the 1930s, as part of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, 
writers working for the Works Projects Administration’s federal writers’ 
project recorded the life stories of more than ten thousand men and women 
from a variety of regions, occupations, and ethnic groups in an effort to 
create “a mosaic portrait of everyday life in America.”287 According to the 
Library of Congress, which now houses the documents, the collection 
provides “the raw content for a broad documentary of both rural and urban 
life, interspersed with accounts and traditions of ethnic group traditions, 
customs regarding planting, cooking, marriage, death, celebrations, 
recreation, and a wide variety of narratives.”288 Similarly, the Legacy 
Project, a nonprofit organization, collects and displays letters and e-mails 
from American soldiers serving during wartime.289 The Voices of Civil 
Rights project is collecting what it deems to be “the world’s largest 
archive of personal accounts of civil rights history.”290 Another non-profit 
 
 
 285. STONE, supra note 69, at 17. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Library of Congress, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ 
Project, 1936–1940, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/wpaintro/intro07.html (last visited July 27, 2005). 
 288. Id. at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/wpaintro/wpalife.html. 
 289. The Legacy Project, http://www.warletters.com/mission/index.html (last visited July 27, 
2005). 
 290. Voices of Civil Rights, http://www.voicesofcivilrights.org/project.html (last visited Aug. 14, 
2005). 
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group, Densho, records oral histories of Japanese Americans incarcerated 
during World War II.291 According to the organization’s official statement, 
it preserves these stories “for their historic value and as a means of 
exploring issues of democracy, intolerance, wartime hysteria, civil rights 
and the responsibilities of citizenship in our increasingly global 
society.”292 Projects like these can be found for almost all cultural groups 
and most major events. There is even an Online Diary History Project that 
seeks to preserve the stories of the earliest Internet bloggers before they 
disappear.293 All of these organizations accept the historical importance of 
preserving these personal accounts. 
This tradition of writing or recording autobiographical speech is a 
recognition that these stories are Americans’ collective and continuing 
history. As Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote, “there is properly no 
history; only biography.”294 Understanding the real-life causes and effects 
of government policies or lack of policies is clearly crucial to effective 
self-governance. If it is true, as American philosopher George Santayana 
once wrote, that “[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it,”295 then autobiographical speech is a necessary tool for a society 
trying to best govern itself. This first-person history, whether discussing 
the distant past or ongoing events, provides Americans with needed 
knowledge and a common ground for debate.  
Suppressing autobiographical speech, on the other hand, runs the risk 
Professor Emerson noted as a justification for free speech, the danger of 
“conceal[ing] the real problems confronting a society and divert[ing] 
public attention from the critical issues”296 and preventing society from 
adapting to changing circumstances. A multitude of personal stories 
entering the public debate can, by itself, function as a grassroots political 
effort by bringing to light the real problems and critical issues Americans 
face. These voices are essential to effective self-governance because only 
by understanding the experiences of others can society best weigh future 
actions. 
 
 
 291. Densho, http://www.densho.org/about/default.asp (last visited July 27, 2005). 
 292. Id. 
 293. The Online Diary History Project, http://www.diaryhistoryproject.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 
2005). 
 294. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS AND LECTURES 240 (1983). 
 295. THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY (E.D. Hirsh et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002), 
available at http://www.bartleby.com/59/3/thosewhocann.html. 
 296. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 
884 (1963). 
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3. Autobiographical Speech Enhances Democracy 
Society-based theorists tend to center their constitutional protections on 
political speech, which is declared to be imperative to a successful 
democracy.297 Yet a closer look at the value of political speech as 
compared with the potential gains of truthful autobiographical speech 
reveals that autobiographical speech provides equally valuable—if not 
superior—information for an effective democracy. In addition, 
autobiographical speech invites a diversity of voices, promotes tolerance, 
and lessens the risk of corporate monopolization of debate. It is perhaps 
for these reasons that the American writer William Dean Howells once 
declared autobiography to be the “most democratic province of the 
republic of letters.”298 
While the lively town hall meeting or formal political debate is often 
viewed as the epitome of democracy-enhancing free speech, 
autobiographical speech adds comparable and potentially more useful 
information to the public discourse. There are many Americans who likely 
do not have an opinion on—or perhaps even the tools to form, or desire to 
express an opinion on—most traditional political topics such as taxes, 
military action, government spending, law and order, foreign relations, or 
economic policy. And even when they do have political opinions, these 
opinions might be of diminished value because they are based on 
misinformation or bias. Everyone, however, can speak about his or her life 
experiences. It is the one topic on which each person is an expert. And it is 
the one topic on which no other person is more knowledgeable than the 
speaker. Through her personal stories each citizen has the potential to 
impart constructive democracy-enhancing information about American 
society and government. The speaker does not even need to intend to enter 
a public debate. As Professor Stone explained: 
Even when the autobiographer does not explicitly cast his or her life 
in shareable or typical terms . . . . [f]or history and the human 
sciences, as well as for literature and philosophy, the recorded 
perceptions of specifically located individuals of the meanings they 
themselves attach to past experiences may prove indispensable.299 
 
 
 297. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 298. Stone, supra note 69 (quoting William Dean Howells, Autobiography, A New Form of 
Literature, Harper’s Monthly 119 (October 1909)). 
 299. Stone, supra note 69, at 6–7. 
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For example, a young man might consider one of his personal stories to 
be nothing more than the tale of the night he was pulled over by a police 
officer while driving through town, but to others it could provide key 
information regarding the propriety of law enforcement policies on racial 
profiling. Another speaker might consider her life story to be simply an 
ongoing account of her difficulties searching for a job to support her child, 
but to her listeners it could shape their viewpoints on foreign trade 
agreements, welfare reform, child care policies, or the minimum wage. A 
pre-teen girl’s weblog in which she regularly obsesses about losing weight 
could seem to her like everyday teen angst,300 but to others it might inform 
them on the need for increased health education regarding eating disorders 
in public schools.301 Under all views of free speech protection, the First 
Amendment would strongly protect the right of each of these hypothetical 
speakers to express a political opinion such as “President Smith should be 
impeached” or “income taxes must be lowered” or “I oppose a military 
draft.” Statements such as these are deemed to be essential to democracy 
and therefore are at the core of free speech rights.302 Yet does the value of 
these political statements outweigh the sincere first-person accounts of the 
speakers’ individual life experiences? In many cases, autobiographical 
speech could provide potentially more beneficial information to a 
successful democracy than would the traditional political statements 
considered to be at the core of the First Amendment. 
Additionally, autobiographical speech is distinctive in its capacity to 
increase the diversity of voices in our public forum. Every individual has a 
life story regardless of her race, gender, age, religion, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, health, employment, wealth, or education. And, as Professor 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., said, “it’s important that the particularity of those 
life experiences be registered with as much frequency as the life stories of 
white men.”303 Allowing a person to talk about his life is empowering to 
every speaker but it offers particular promise for minorities and other 
 
 
 300. See, e.g., Sora Song, Starvation on the Web, TIME, July 18, 2005 at 57 (discussing the trend 
of pro-anorexia websites and weblogs where “girls as young as 10 share tips for losing weight”). 
 301. For an example of personal stories being used to further policy debate in public education, 
see Karen E. Norum, Hearing Voices—ALL of Them, http://www.coe.uga.edu/quig/norum.html (last 
visited May 25, 2007) (“[A] large body of practical wisdom [about public education] has been deemed 
expendable by neglecting and/or ignoring the voices of childless taxpayers, the homeless, parents, and 
even teachers.”). 
 302. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) 
(stating that “[c]ore political speech occupies the highest, most protected position” in First 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
 303. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Lifting the Veil, in INVENTING THE TRUTH 101, 111 (William Zinsser 
ed., rev. and expanded 1998). 
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marginalized groups to share perspectives that might not otherwise be 
expressed. Professor Anne Coughlin pointed out that “[c]learly, 
autobiography does perform an emancipatory function by conferring a 
voice on those whom culture has silenced.”304 It is perhaps for this reason 
that autobiography has been embraced by numerous minority305 or 
oppressed cultural groups including African-Americans, women, 
homosexuals, the disabled, the elderly,306 and others. Professor Stone 
observed that “[i]n this century, and particularly in the years since World 
War II, no other mode of American expression seems to have more widely 
or subtly reflected the diversities of American experience.”307 Society-
based First Amendment theorists have recognized the significant nexus 
between a diversity of viewpoints and an effective democracy. As Judge 
Learned Hand explained, in matters of public interest “right conclusions 
are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues.”308 Because 
autobiographical speech is particularly important for increasing the 
diversity of viewpoints and including people who might otherwise be 
absent from the history, protecting the right of each individual to tell his or 
her personal life story is vital for any true democracy.  
Furthermore, the risk that corporate control over communication 
channels will silence minority voices, as expressed by society-based 
scholars like professors Owen Fiss and Cass Sunstein,309 is lessened with 
autobiographical speech. As mentioned before, the stories themselves 
belong to the individuals. Everyone has innate expert status on his or her 
life story thus eliminating any requirement for specialized education or 
other privilege in order to tell it.310 But while unique, life stories are also 
abundant, giving autobiographical speech the power of numbers. Thus the 
individuality and plentitude of autobiographical stories protect them 
somewhat from marginalization by speakers with more power and wealth.  
Clearly, however, the ability of speakers to distribute their stories to 
others might be affected by corporate powers or a lack of resources. To 
many, the Internet promises to help correct this inequity. Perhaps it is for 
 
 
 304. Coughlin, supra note 42, at 1250. 
 305. Many scholars use the term “outsiders” instead of “minority,” because the latter “belies the 
numerical significance of the constituencies typically excluded from jurisprudential discourse.” 
Matsuda, supra note 42, at 2323 n.15. 
 306. See Jennifer L. Huget, Blogging Through The Ages: Jen’s Ruminations on Blogs Devoted to 
Aging, WASH. POST F01 (Aug. 2, 2005) (discussing the trend of “elderblogs”). 
 307. STONE, supra note 69, at 1. 
 308. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943). 
 309. See Sunstein, supra note 138, at 17–18. 
 310. This, of course, assumes some basic level of mental consciousness and communication 
ability. 
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this reason that the Capitol Hill intern, Jessica Cutler, told a reporter that 
“[e]veryone should have a blog. It’s the most democratic thing ever.”311 
Similarly, the blogger identified as “Fionnaigh” opined that “[b]logging 
provides an opportunity for a diverse range of people to air their views. . . . 
[I]t is an ideal form for minority groups, those who are denied a voice in 
the mainstream media. . . .”312 Certainly there are many Americans who do 
not possess the needed computer skills and resources to create their own 
weblog. But that number is decreasing every year. A recent survey found 
that about eighty-seven percent of teenagers use the Internet313 and the 
number continues to grow. These numbers indicate that a time when most 
if not all Americans will have the power to publish and broadcast their life 
stories, if they so desire, is approaching. 
Hearing a range of autobiographical speech from a diverse group of 
speakers also promises to enhance society’s tolerance of others. Adopting 
Professor Lee Bollinger’s theory that free speech is linked to a more 
tolerant society,314 the protection of autobiographical speech is essential. If 
the goal of the First Amendment is, as Bollinger suggested, to force 
members of this “large and complex society, with people of varied beliefs 
and interests” to tolerate each other,315 then autobiographical speech must 
be at the center of any constitutional protection. Hearing another’s life 
story is essential to understanding, and eventually accepting, that person’s 
current views and beliefs. For this reason the correlation between societal 
tolerance and autobiographical speech is unrivaled as compared to any 
other type of speech. For example, hearing a personal story of someone 
who suffered sexual abuse by religious leaders might be the only way one 
person will understand and tolerate another’s viewpoint that religious 
institutions are corrupt. Similarly, hearing a personal story from someone 
who received humanitarian kindness from religious groups might be the 
only way the first speaker will understand and tolerate the other’s 
viewpoint that religious institutions deserve increased government 
protections. In addition to promoting understanding and tolerance, 
listening to each other’s stories pushes each person to constantly 
reexamine and adjust his or her views based on new information. 
 
 
 311. Witt, supra note 13, at 16. 
 312. Beautiful Monsters, supra note 94. 
 313. AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW/INTERNET, TEENS AND TECHNOLOGY (2005), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Teens_Tech_July2005web.pdf. 
 314. BOLLINGER, supra note 140, at 140–44. 
 315. Bollinger, supra note 142, at 984. 
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Autobiographical speech, therefore, might be the most effective form of 
speech to promote a tolerant society and an effective democracy. 
It is often repeated that political speech is at the “core” of First 
Amendment protection316—the society-based free speech theorists in 
particular anoint political speech with the highest levels of constitutional 
protection.317 Even the most restrictive theory propounded by Judge Bork 
concludes that the First Amendment safeguards “explicitly political” 
speech.318 Yet truthful autobiographical speech provides equal—if not 
better—information to aid an effective democracy than that offered by 
political speech. Allowing citizens to speak freely about their life 
experiences provides society with essential information regarding the truth 
of American culture and the human condition. This information promises 
to increase the effectiveness of government policies and actions. It leads to 
acknowledgment and understanding of diverse viewpoints and, thereby, 
greater hope for tolerance. It empowers each individual—regardless of 
class, gender, race, religion, or age—to speak about the one topic on which 
she is the preeminent expert and thereby participate in her own unique way 
in the public debate. The chilling of such speech, on the other hand, 
impairs all of these goals of a democratic society. If, as this discussion 
concludes, the democracy-enhancing benefits of autobiographical speech 
are on par with or surpass political speech, then each must be deserving of 
the same heightened constitutional protection.  
IV. DEFINING AND PROTECTING THE FREEDOM OF  
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SPEECH 
The myriad theories regarding the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment are passionately held and fiercely debated. This Article makes 
no comment on the correctness of any of these theories. Rather, it 
concludes that truthful autobiographical speech occupies an exceptional 
place in the public discourse—perhaps rivaled only by political speech—
by advancing the broad range of free speech goals. Like political speech, 
autobiographical speech makes a fundamental contribution to the public 
discourse while at the same time representing the essence of what it means 
to be an autonomous human being. Denying a person the right to give 
 
 
 316. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that 
a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs.”). 
 317. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 318. Bork, supra note 130, at 28. 
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testimony of his life should not be deemed any less an affront to a 
democracy of free individuals than denying that person the right to speak 
in favor of the candidate of his choice. Thus any discussion of the value of 
different categories of speech319 should place autobiographical speech at 
the center of the constitutional shield. Autobiographical speech is 
deserving of recognition and protection by the courts. Recognition is the 
first step. Protection is the second. Therefore, this Part suggests a proposal 
of first how autobiographical speech should be defined and then how it 
should be protected. 
A. A Proposed Definition of Autobiographical Speech 
Once the constitutional importance of autobiographical speech is 
recognized, the next challenge is to define the speech deserving of 
protection. The definition of a category of speech can be one of the most 
challenging parts of the analysis. As discussed earlier, the question of how 
to define “political” speech has relentlessly plagued society-based theorists 
and there remains no consensus.320 Bork’s “explicitly political” definition 
was too narrow for most, while Meiklejohn’s ever-expanding definition 
drew protests that it was too inclusive.321 Several commentators have 
commented on the difficulty of distinguishing between traditional 
“political” speech and speech on any matter. Professor Paul Finkelman 
discussed speech on cultural matters and observed that “[s]peech that on 
its face addresses cultural issues such as sex and birth control may at the 
same time address political issues such as fitness to serve public office.”322 
Similarly, Professor Garrett Epps argued that speech by criminals about 
their crimes, “even when distasteful, is too close to the so-called ‘core’ of 
political speech to make its excision from the body of protected speech a 
risk-free operation.”323 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky discussed the 
struggle to define political speech and noted, “[v]irtually everything from 
comic strips to commercial advertisements to even pornography can have 
a political dimension.”324 
 
 
 319. Many courts and scholars dispute the priority of any categorization of speech based on 
content. See, e.g., Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 671, 671–75 & n.2 (and sources cited therein) (1983). 
 320. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 321. See id. 
 322. Paul Finkelman, Cultural Speech and Political Speech in Historical Perspective, 79 B.U. L. 
REV. 717, 720 (1999) (book review). 
 323. Garrett Epps, Wising Up: “Son of Sam” Laws and the Speech and Press Clauses, 70 N.C. L. 
REV. 493, 549 (1992). 
 324. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 927 (3d ed. 2005). 
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The same dilemma is present with autobiographical speech. A 
definition that is too liberal runs the risk of swallowing too much speech, 
making the category overprotective and too broad to be of use. A 
definition that is too strict leaves valuable speech vulnerable. Providing 
insufficient qualifiers creates vagueness, while including too many leaves 
inadequate breathing room. An overly complex definition, moreover, 
creates the danger of beneficial speech being wrongly chilled. This is, as 
Professor Lawrence Lessig described, “the contingency of present First 
Amendment doctrine.”325 These are, nonetheless, the complexities of 
human speech that must be accepted to move forward. In keeping with the 
values of autobiographical speech discussed, this Article offers this 
inaugural definition: autobiographical speech is speech that is substantially 
related to the story of the speaker’s life and that a reasonable person would 
presume was communicated with the primary intent of sharing information 
about the speaker.  
This definition, while relatively simple, includes several limiting 
elements. Each limiting device aims to exclude speech that is not truly 
autobiographical while still capturing the most valuable speech. First, the 
“substantially related” element requires that there be a significant nexus 
between the information communicated and the speaker’s life. This is 
borrowed in part from the law of privacy torts, which protects the 
publication of facts that are substantially related to topics that are 
newsworthy or in the public interest in order to prevent “a morbid and 
sensational prying into private lives for its own sake.”326 The idea is the 
same here. The individual and societal benefits of autobiographical speech 
discussed in this Article are lessened the further the speech drifts from the 
speaker. A substantial relation requirement prevents a story that begins “I 
met Susan for lunch today and she told me a story about John” from 
turning the story primarily about John into the speaker’s autobiographical 
speech about the events of his day. While arguably “autobiographical” in 
the strictest sense, the speaker telling the story of his lunch with Susan and 
in it retelling a gossipy story about John would not generate the significant 
benefits of autobiographical speech that this Article hopes to protect. The 
substantial relation question, of course, is highly dependent on the context 
of the speech. If, for example, John was the speaker’s child and the story 
was that John had been in a debilitating car accident, then the information 
likely would be substantially related to the speaker’s life. The speaker’s 
 
 
 325. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of CyberLaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1753 (1995). 
 326. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977). 
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decision in that scenario to tell the story of the day he learned about his 
son’s accident would trigger the many benefits of autobiographical speech 
and thus would be deserving of heightened protection. 
Second, the definition requires the speech to be about “the story of the 
speaker’s life.” This limiting element, again, simply demands that the 
speech be about the speaker. Certainly the story of the speaker’s life can 
include a broad range of information, both mundane and dramatic, and 
take a number of forms such as daily events, personal observations, 
thoughts, and emotions. But, at the same time, not every random thing the 
speaker ever knows, learns, sees, hears, feels, or smells necessarily 
impacts the speaker’s life story. As before, it is ultimately a matter of 
degree and context. Generally the smaller the role the speaker plays in the 
storyline, the less it is like autobiographical speech. 
Finally, the definition includes an objective intent requirement.327 The 
unique values and benefits of autobiographical speech stem from the 
speaker’s desire to share information about herself with others. As long as 
the speaker’s primary intent is to communicate information about herself, 
the goal of sharing the personal information is not relevant. Thus the 
speaker might reveal information about herself to seek fame, to create a 
record for the future, to blow off steam, to shock, to cry for help, to reflect 
on the past, to amuse or entertain, to offer guidance to others, or simply to 
pass the time. But the primary intent must remain on the self and a desire 
to communicate information about oneself. Speech that intends to impart 
information about others, such as repeating a gossipy story, would not be 
autobiographical. Because the focus is on the intent of the speaker, the 
definition does not include an element that the speech must be received by 
the listener as autobiographical.  
This requirement would also function to exclude speech that is spoken 
with another primary intent. Of course, there is much that can be learned 
about a speaker from speech that is not spoken with the intent to reveal 
personal information. While arguably still constitutionally valuable under 
other standards, such speech would not fall into the category of 
autobiographical speech. Take, for example, a speaker whose primary 
intent is to harass and threaten his listener with a racially derogatory 
statement like this message received by Professor Jerry Kang after 
identifying himself as African American in an Internet chat room: “‘hey 
nigger . . . betta watch out we got an eye on you and others do to your 
 
 
 327. The intent requirement is based on an objective “reasonable person” standard to avoid the 
difficulties involving a court inquiry into the speaker’s subjective intent. 
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reported to the aryan nation KKK mutherfucker!!’”328 Obviously this type 
of racist attack imparts a great deal of information about the speaker, yet a 
reasonable person would presume the statement was made with the 
primary intent to harass and, therefore, is not autobiographical speech. 
Another statement, however, could be spoken with a different intent even 
though it also involves hateful and derogatory language. For example, 
J.W. Milam, one of the acquitted killers of Emmett Till, a fourteen-year-
old African-American boy, stated in his confession: “‘I’m no bully; I 
never hurt a nigger in my life. I like niggers—in their place—I know how 
to work ’em.’”329 A reasonable person would believe this statement was 
spoken with the primary intent of revealing information about himself, so 
the speech would be autobiographical. The second statement, of course, 
still raises important issues of harm that any legal analysis can and should 
consider.330 The point is simply that the autobiographical component of 
the statement also needs to be recognized. By comparison, a statement can 
be both racist and political—for example, “‘the Justice Department is 
trying to make us draw nigger [voting] districts and I don’t want to draw 
nigger districts.’”331 In such a case our courts would weigh the political 
speech aspect of the statement with great care before allowing any 
restrictions.332 The same constitutional caution is warranted with 
autobiographical speech. 
It is worth noting that nothing in this definition explicitly requires the 
speaker to identify herself by name. With all speech, “the anonymity of an 
author is not ordinarily a sufficient reason to exclude her work product 
from the protections of the First Amendment.”333 This reasoning applies to 
autobiographical speech because the benefits are present even when 
anonymous. This is seen in the tradition of anonymity in confessional and 
 
 
 328. Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1134 (2000).  
 329. William Bradford Huie, The Shocking Story of Approved Killing in Mississippi, LOOK (Jan. 
24, 1956), reprinted in 1 REPORTING CIVIL RIGHTS: AMERICAN JOURNALISM 1941–1963 232, 239 
(Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 2003) (quoting the confession of J.W. Milam). 
 330. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 42, at 2360 (“[E]xplicit content-based rejection of narrowly 
defined racist speech is more protective of civil liberties than the competing-interests tests or the 
likely-to-incite-violence tests that can spill over to censor forms of political speech.”). 
 331. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 501 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d 459 U.S. 1166 (1983) (quoting 
deposition testimony of Georgia Representative Joe Mack Wilson). 
 332. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–86 (discussing the constitutionality of 
a bias-motivated crime ordinance that might encompass protected speech such as political speech); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (noting that the key difference between the campaign 
financing law at issue and other restrictions on speech that were upheld was that they were 
“restrictions on political communication and association by persons, groups, candidates and political 
parties in addition to any reasonable time, place, and manner regulations otherwise imposed”). 
 333. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 (1995). 
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therapeutic autobiographical speech such as Catholic confession or 
Alcoholics Anonymous. Similarly, mainstream publishers have published 
several autobiographies written anonymously or under pseudonyms.334 
Some persecuted groups and powerless victims, moreover, are able to tell 
their stories “either anonymously or not at all.”335 As the Supreme Court 
has stated, “[a]nonymity thereby provides a way for a writer who may be 
personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge her message 
simply because they do not like its proponent.”336 Anonymous 
autobiographical speech, moreover, might lessen conflicts by hiding the 
identity of not only the speaker but others in the speaker’s story as well. 
But as with other types of speech, such as anonymous political speech, 
anonymous autobiographical speech raises difficulties in accountability.337 
Most important to this discussion, anonymity could hinder the ability to 
judge the truthfulness of the speech.  
In sum, this definition attempts to carve out purely autobiographical 
speech while also protecting the broad range of topics and forms 
autobiographical speech can embody. Autobiographical speech under this 
definition can be a traditional published memoir or a short and symbolic 
statement (for example, a bumper sticker with the Greek letters “ΔΔΔ” 
placed on a car with the intent to communicate that the driver is a member 
of a particular college sorority would fit this definition of autobiographical 
speech). The key point is for the focus to stay on the speaker’s life story 
and for the speaker to intend to convey information about herself. As with 
any speech issue, the line is difficult to draw and grey areas are 
unavoidable. These difficulties are not necessarily a fault of the definition 
but rather simply an acceptance of the complexities of free speech law and 
 
 
 334. Anonymously written autobiographies fall into a range of categories. There are many written 
by women living under oppressive regimes. See, e.g., LATIFA, MY FORBIDDEN FACE: GROWING UP 
UNDER THE TALIBAN: A YOUNG WOMAN’S STORY (Linda Coverdale trans., 2001) (written under a 
pseudonym by an Afghan teenage girl); ANONYMOUS, A WOMAN IN BERLIN: EIGHT WEEKS IN THE 
CONQUERED CITY (Boehm Phillips trans., Metropolitan 2005) (an anonymous diary written during the 
1945 Russian invasion of Berlin); SOUAD, BURNED ALIVE: A VICTIM OF THE LAW OF MEN (Warner 
Books 2004) (2003) (written under a one-word pseudonym by a Palestinian woman who survived an 
honor crime). Another example is the eleven-volume autobiography by an unnamed Victorian 
gentleman about his sexual adventures, probably written in the 1880s, which has been said to contain 
“invaluable material for social and cultural historians, literary scholars, students of manners and 
morals.” JAMES KINCAID, Introduction to ANONYMOUS, MY SECRET LIFE v (Penguin Books 1996). A 
more benign example is found in the popular series of autobiographical books about the experiences of 
an English veterinarian, which were written under the pseudonym James Herriot. See JAMES HERRIOT, 
ALL CREATURES GREAT AND SMALL (1998). 
 335. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (discussing anonymous political speech). 
 336. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342. 
 337. See id. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that anonymity eliminates accountability of the 
speaker and regulations against it are only problematic in narrow circumstances). 
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human communication. This definition is an initial attempt to identify the 
category of autobiographical speech that provides the immense personal 
and societal benefits discussed and is, therefore, deserving of the highest 
constitutional protection. 
B. Early Thoughts on Protecting Autobiographical Speech 
Because, to date, the issue of autobiographical speech under the First 
Amendment has received virtually no court or scholarly attention, it is the 
primary goal of this Article simply to bring autobiographical speech to the 
surface. The aim is to demonstrate that autobiographical speech is a 
distinct and important category of speech that thoroughly fulfills and 
advances the spectrum of justifications for constitutional protection of 
speech. How exactly this new recognition and proposed definition of 
autobiographical speech should and will play out in the legal arena is still 
unknown. That uncertainty is acceptable as long as the value of the speech 
is no longer ignored. As Professor Lawrence Lessig explained, “there is a 
great value and an important need for lower courts to wrestle with these 
[First Amendment] questions, if only to create a body of legal material 
from which others may draw in considering these questions. . . . [S]table 
doctrine is only built upon the ground of long-standing 
experimentation.”338 
The proper method for protecting the freedom of autobiographical 
speech likely will depend on the context in which it appears. A future 
article will examine the conflict between autobiographical speech and the 
privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts. As stated earlier, the rise 
of the “tell-all” era combined with new technological outlets for speech 
likely will result in increased litigation pitting privacy interests against the 
freedom of autobiographical speech—as found in the Jessica Cutler case. 
A face-off with privacy issues is currently the most pressing issue 
regarding autobiographical speech. This conflict is inevitable because the 
freedom to speak about yourself is, in many ways, the mirror image of the 
right of privacy as Warren and Brandeis first outlined it.339 They wrote in 
favor of a right that would secure “to each individual the right of 
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions shall be communicated to others.”340 This is, indeed, the same 
 
 
 338. Lessig, supra note 325, at 1752–53 (discussing the application of First Amendment doctrine 
to cyberspace). 
 339. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 340. Id. at 198. 
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right that this Article aims to protect through the concept of 
autobiographical speech. One simply protects the desire to conceal the 
information while the other protects the desire to share it. In the messy 
interlocking web of human relationships, conflict over the two desires is 
unavoidable. 
Issues involving autobiographical speech are also possible in numerous 
other legal areas. In the area of free speech alone, the right of 
autobiographical speech conceivably might overlap with issues of 
pornography, obscenity, commercial speech, student speech,341 or hate 
speech. Outside of civil torts, autobiographical speech and privacy might 
clash through new privacy legislation in Congress and the states. It is also 
possible to imagine autobiographical speech issues arising in the areas of 
intellectual property such as trademark, copyright, or rights of publicity. 
Criminal law certainly involves autobiographical speech by both the 
defendant and the victim. Employment and business law promise disputes 
over autobiographical speech on subjects such as trade secrets, 
confidentiality agreements, whistleblower statutes, or workplace 
harassment. Autobiographical speech involving government employees 
raises additional issues.342 In one case, for example, laws preventing the 
revelation of government classified information prevailed in the Supreme 
Court against the autobiographical speech of a former CIA agent.343 In all 
of these potential cases, the appropriate damages and remedies are also a 
question.344 It would not be prudent or really even possible, at this early 
stage, to attempt to address these many situations. Instead this Part offers a 
few general guidelines on the protection of the right. 
As an initial matter it is important to point out that autobiographical 
speech is a speech right, not a property right, and therefore should be 
guarded by the First Amendment of the Constitution. It is the personal 
expression of autobiographical speech, not a property interest in the stories 
 
 
 341. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (allowing school 
administrators to censor articles in student newspaper regarding the personal experiences of students 
with pregnancy and divorce and specifically noting one student’s statements that prior to divorcing her 
mother, her father “wasn’t spending enough time with my mom, my sister and I,” “was always out of 
town on business or out late playing cards with the guys,” and “always argued about everything” with 
her mother). Id. at 263. 
 342. See, e.g., undated posting http://www.67cshdocs.com/ (purporting to be the weblog of an 
army physician ordered to stop blogging because weblog entries violated army regulations) (copy on 
file with author). 
 343. See United States v. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (finding former CIA agent breached 
fiduciary obligation to employer by failing to submit manuscript of personal memoirs for 
prepublication review although no confidential information was revealed). 
 344. In Snepp, for example, the Court ordered that constructive trust be imposed on the profits 
from Snepp’s book. Id. at 515–16. 
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themselves, which creates the individual and societal benefits discussed. 
This is a major difference between autobiographical speech and the right 
of privacy as defined by Warren and Brandeis, who drew their privacy 
concept out of “[t]he right of property in its widest sense” although 
ultimately declaring it to be a distinct right.345 Thus the right of 
autobiographical speech is not a common law right protected through the 
law of civil torts but rather a constitutional one protected by the free 
speech clause. The consequences of this distinction are important. As with 
all speech issues, prior restraint and delay of speech are themselves a 
special harm that should raise concern.346 Similarly, there is a risk of self-
censorship, “a harm that can be realized even without an actual 
prosecution.”347 Thus adequate breathing room is necessary. Yet as with 
other speech, autobiographical speech is subject to content-neutral 
restrictions that are narrowly tailored and serve a significant government 
interest.348 And, as discussed earlier, false or defamatory autobiographical 
speech would require a different analysis. 
Second, the protection this Article proposes for autobiographical 
speech is much like that bestowed on political speech. A person’s right to 
express her individual political views and her right to make a truthful 
record of her life’s events are both fundamental interests that offer 
unrivaled personal and societal benefits. Therefore many of the same 
ideals and problems apply to the protection of autobiographical speech as 
to political speech. Like political speech, any attempt to silence 
autobiographical speech should set off constitutional alarms and receive 
the highest levels of scrutiny.349 Also like political speech, it should be 
recognized that autobiographical speech can be expressed in many formats 
including through speech that is written, spoken, sung, photographed, 
danced, or painted.350 The main limitation of these various methods of 
expressing autobiographical speech is simply that the more difficult it is to 
 
 
 345. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 339, at 211. 
 346. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (calling prior restraints on speech 
“the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights”). 
 347. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988). 
 348. See Word v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 349. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (stating a regulation on “core political speech” is subjected to 
“exacting scrutiny” and upheld “only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest”). 
 350. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. at 358 (discussing cross burning and stating that the 
“First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech”); 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (discussing protection for nude dancing); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 
405–06 (discussing protection for flag burning); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 
(1968) (discussing protection for burning of draft cards); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (discussing protection for the wearing of black armbands). 
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discern the autobiographical message and intent of the speaker, the less 
likely the speech will be recognized as autobiographical.  
One noteworthy difference between the protection of autobiographical 
speech and the protection of political speech is the primary concern of 
censorship. With political speech, the fear is usually that a message will be 
silenced based on its particular viewpoint on an issue, but with 
autobiographical speech the worry is more likely that the speaker will be 
gagged because of his social status or lifestyle. In other words, the danger 
is that autobiographical speakers will be quieted because their lives are 
viewed as insignificant or objectionable. 
Finally, there should not be a requirement that the autobiographical 
speech be about a topic “in the public interest” to warrant protection. Most 
likely, such speech would be protected through already existing legal 
doctrine. For example, newsworthy speech is already protected from most 
privacy tort claims and speech about a public person or matter already 
receives a higher level of protection from defamation suits.351 Speech 
about a political issue, moreover, is already protected through the political 
speech doctrine.352 Therefore adding a public interest requirement would 
likely render the autobiographical speech category moot.  
More importantly, giving an uninterested party the power to adjudge 
the public worthiness of another person’s autobiographical speech would 
destroy the personal autonomy interests of free humans talking about their 
lives. It also would open the door for the censorship of stories that, while 
undervalued today, could provide important knowledge to future 
generations. Most concerning is that a public interest requirement would 
allow the autobiographical speech of minorities and the oppressed to be 
wrongly silenced as unimportant in the public debate. Yet, it is precisely 
this type of seemingly non-newsworthy speech by ordinary citizens 
regarding everyday occurrences and observations that is at the heart of the 
autobiographical speech concept. This is the speech that is threatened to be 
undervalued and chilled by our current system and the speech that has the 
most insights to offer. The power to decide what is of consequence in a 
person’s life story should ultimately lie with that person alone. As long as 
the content and intention of the speech is truly autobiographical, its 
perceived importance by others should not affect its constitutional 
protection. 
 
 
 351. See Zimmerman, supra note 169, at 379 n.81. 
 352. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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CONCLUSION 
Humans talking about themselves and their lives is a longstanding and 
enduring phenomenon. While receiving significant historical, scientific, 
religious, and philosophical respect, autobiographical speech has yet to 
engender any legal debate on its constitutional role. This Article does not 
attempt to address every hypothetical or practical consideration that courts 
will face involving the freedom of autobiographical speech. It also does 
not seek to engage in the numerous debates over free speech theory or 
First Amendment doctrine. Instead, the narrow aim is to bring overdue 
recognition to a category of valuable speech that heretofore has gone 
unnoticed by courts and scholars.  
Perhaps paralleled only by political speech, truthful autobiographical 
speech is rare in its ability to promote the wide range of justifications for 
constitutional protection. It respects human autonomy. It comments on the 
human condition. It introduces a diverse society to itself. It records 
individual lives and collective histories. It empowers the powerless. It 
promotes understanding and tolerance. It preserves democracy. The 
benefits flow both to the individual speaker as well as to current and future 
societies. Stifling autobiographical speech does more than censor 
viewpoints—it silences lives. If prevented from telling their stories, people 
who wish to give witness to their existence will instead be erased from the 
public sphere. Increasingly more people today are expressing their desires 
to speak out about their lives, and new technologies promise them a 
broader audience than previously imagined. They are, in essence, drafting 
a new chapter in the ongoing and lengthy American story. Therefore, it is 
time to recognize and protect their freedom of autobiographical speech. 
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